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# **West Europe Report**

No. 1611



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## WEST EUROPE REPORT

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## WILLY CLAES VOICES SOMBER PROGNOSIS FOR ECONOMY

Zurich NEUE ZUERCHER ZEITUNG in German 11 Jul 80 p 10

[Article by PMR: "The 'Belgian Sickness'"]

[Text] Brussels, 9 July--Belgium's Minister of Economic Affairs Willy Claes startled his countrymen: In a television discussion, the socialist minister painted such a gloomy picture of his country's economic future, that during the days that followed, political discussions and newspaper headlines were completely dominated by his prophesies of woes. The energetic Fleming indicated that unless Belgium finally pulled itself together, the number of unemployed people would double by 1985, rising to 600,000--about 15 percent of the country's work force, and the state deficit would rise from the current amount of 232 billion Belgian francs to 730 billion Belgian francs. The state was going bankrupt at a fast rate, and the last phase was even threatening to question the parliamentary system. Against the threatening collapse, Claes could recommend to his countrymen only one remedy: to tighten the belt. People in all walks of life, retired persons, self-employed professionals and business managers must be content with less income. The economy must take precedence over social policies, because unless it recovered quickly, sooner or later the entire system of social security would collapse.

## Confirmed Business Worries

Naturally, Belgian employers' associations like to listen to such a confirmation of their constant complaints, coming from the mouth of a socialist minister. For a long time, they have been blaming record-high wages--when compared to other European countries--and the steadily increasing debt in the state budget for the Belgian sickness. An additional factor is Belgium's pioneer role when it comes to reducing work time: According to the most recent Labor Ministry statistics, every other Belgian wage earner is already working less than 40 hours per week. During labor negotiations that took place during the last 12 months, reduced work time was given priority over all other demands.

## Reitent Unions

Labor unions, on the other hand, are not receptive to the minister of economic affairs' warning: they want to preserve their claim to social possessions, and strict linkage of wages to the consumer price index is of special importance in Belgium. Any discussion of adjusting this index to petroleum price increases, has so far been nipped in the bud. Furthermore, time and again unions have been lodging complaints against the ruthless attitude of multinational corporations and domestic holding companies, because they are moving their capital outside the country. According to figures by the Ministry of Economic Affairs, 166 foreign firms pulled out of Belgium last year, which caused the loss of almost 12,600 jobs. Although new foreign investments, totaling 10.7 billion Belgian francs, were still higher than the pulled-out investments, by 2.7 billion Belgian francs, only 630 new jobs were created, since the major part fell to the petrochemical industry in the Antwerp harbor. Compared to 1978, direct foreign investments in Belgium declined by 12 percent. In the opinion of the minister of economic affairs, the confidence of foreign investors has been shaken to a large extent by the continuing government crises.

## Excessive      and on the Capital Market

Another contributing factor to these government crises is the major ailment of the Belgian economy, the continually growing state deficits. For the current year, the net deficit of the official budget is estimated at 232 billion Belgian francs, 20 billion francs higher than it was in 1978. When this amount is added to 100 billion Belgian francs in payments that will be due, it becomes apparent that the financial needs of the state are responsible for an excessive demand in the Belgian capital market. Last year, the minister of finance began to seek refuge on foreign markets. During the first 5 months of 1980 alone, more than half of the new state debts, 116 billion Belgian francs, were the result of money borrowed abroad.

The extraordinary burden placed on the capital market by the public sector and the defense of the foreign-exchange rate of the Belgian franc drove up Belgian interest rates to record heights in Europe. While the rate of inflation was still relatively modest--in June it was 6.2 percent--nominal Belgian interest rates climbed as high as they did in the United States and in Great Britain. At the end of March, the Kredietbank computed a real interest of 11 percent on the Belgian money market, compared to only 5.45 percent in the neighboring Netherlands and 4 percent in the FRG. Even on the Belgian capital market, the real yield of 5.65 percent surpassed the level of most industrial countries. To be sure, the high interest rates were responsible for a stability of the Belgian currency on foreign currency markets that was greater than it had been for a long time, but it also caused additional problems for some industries that were already suffering, such as the building industry.

The Marten government, which has been in office since May, has made many attempts to get out of this mess. It is trying to inject new impulses into the economy by reducing the income tax and eliminating the value-added tax on investments. Simultaneously it wants to prevent a bigger deficit in the budget by increasing indirect taxes on gasoline, alcohol, margarine,

automobiles and "other luxury items." Nevertheless, like its predecessors in recent years, it is forced to relegate economic policies to a position of less importance because, according to Minister of Economic Affairs Claes, almost the entire working time is consumed by Belgium's regionalization. For "real problems," the minister told the television audience, at the most 2 hours per week are left.

8991

CSO: 3103

## POLITICAL PARTIES WORRIED ABOUT ECONOMIC CRISIS

Brussels LE SOIR in French 9 Jul 80 p 2

[Text] In a Monday meeting all of the party bureaus mentioned economic problems, and some of them reacted to a television speech on Sunday by Willy Claes, minister of Economic Affairs.

"Mr Claes emphasized that the responsibility is a shared one," said Andre Cools, chairman of the PS [Socialist Party], whose bureau held an unusual meeting in Liege.

According to the PS chairman, "Budgetary law is an element of crisis solution that we are familiar with. Regionalization, as Mr Claes emphasized, is not an automatic response to crisis; it consists chiefly of assuming many responsibilities and reforming the constitution is not enough to solve the problem."

On the other hand, Mr Cools was questioned about the attitude of the opposition. "We have gone through 400 amendments to Bill 434," he says, "and I am beginning to doubt the opposition's good faith."

Concerning the iron and steel industry, Mr Cools indicated that he had reported on the various talks he had had on that subject. "The new troubles are not to be underestimated," he said. Because of the additional slump in the economic climate in the steel sector, the American position is also very worrisome, and it is clear that Jimmy Carter will take no position at present that would freeze American steel. But the necessary investments are about to be realized," he added, alluding to the forthcoming decisions of the CMES [expansion unknown].

At the CVP [Social Christian Party] bureau they dealt with the work of Parliament, especially government reform and the vote on the budgetary law, which was adopted in committee (Saturday morning, shortly before 0700!). Questioned as to whether the various batches of law might yet be voted on before the parliamentary vacation, Leo Tindemans, the party chairman, replied, "This is still officially possible."

The CVP bureau also expressed "its great anxiety" on the subject of the development of the situation in the steel and textile sectors, as well as in shipbuilding and the building trades.

In the communique issued after its meeting the CVP "urges the government, considering that its financial means are tight, to conceive a new policy by means of which the economic life might be encouraged and the crisis combated. The bureau emphasized the necessity of conducting a coordinated policy in such a way that fiscal policy, new projects, savings and investments are oriented in the same direction. Absolute priority must be given to the country's economic future." In this regard Mr Tindemans revealed the existence of "an anti-crisis steering group (stuurgroep)," which is working in collaboration with the PSC [Christian Social Party] under the leadership of Viscount Gaston Eyskens, the former prime minister. The deadline for this working group to reveal its conclusions has not yet been set. "But," Mr Tindemans added, "the problem will certainly not be postponed indefinitely."

Finally, the CVP bureau once again stressed "the extreme urgency of enforcing the linguistic laws in the matter of installing a Flemish school at Comines, so that the individuals concerned may register their children in time, before the next school year."

Meeting under the chairmanship of Mme Antoinette Spaak, the FDF [Democratic Front of Brussels French Speakers] bureau issued a communique in which it registers surprise at the statements made yesterday on television on behalf of the government by Minister Claes.

"It is unacceptable," the FDF believes, "for a minister to cry catastrophe when for several years he himself and the traditional parties have been those most responsible for the country's economic policy, and for its failure."

The FDF recalls that "Mr Claes' claims to moderation did not prevent him from refusing any debate on energy policy and conservation, from causing to be voted in an ineffectual industrial orientation law, from applying a more effective and more generous steel policy in Flanders than in Wallonia, from favoring the Campine coal mines by giving them 10,000,000,000 in annual subsidies, of which the most recent portion, 3,500,000,000, is not even legal, and lastly from systematically opposing any scientific research in Wallonia and in Brussels for the benefit of Mol."

The FDF emphasizes that "Mr Claes has merely detailed the visible bankruptcy of the policy of the traditional parties, in terms of employment and the balance of payments."

According to the FDF, "The CVP, having with its accomplices sabotaged true government reform for three years, bears a crushing responsibility for the dramatic exacerbation of the crisis, the obvious victims of which are, first Brussels and then Wallonia."

With regard to the work of Parliament the FDF "condemns contempt for democracy and the scandalous abuse of majority by the traditional parties, which speculate on the physical exhaustion of a minority, which is due to mistrust of commitments made in public session, to continual daily performances lasting more than 14 hours, while the members of the majority, taking advantage of their numbers, relax comfortably."

The FDF finally stigmatizes "the attitude of the French speaking members of Parliament from the traditional parties, who last Tuesday in the Cultural Council pretended to support the French speakers of the fringe and once more completely abandoned them on Thursday after the Chamber meeting, by rejecting the FDF amendments, with the CVP and the VU [People's Union]."

As for the Flemish Socialists' bureau, it characterized as "positive" the results of Chancellor Schmidt's recent trip to Moscow. "Rather than approach the Euromissiles problem from a purely military point of view," said Mr Van Miert, "there is now an opportunity to avoid, by means of political negotiations, the aimless process that was believed to be inevitable." The SP [Socialist Party] bureau now believes that it "is absolutely necessary to respect the government accord postponing to 1981 any definite decision on Belgium's part regarding the installation of Euromissiles on its territory."

Lastly, concerning national policy, the Flemish Socialists believe that all the work anticipated before the vacation must be realized (government reform, budgetary law, framework law on social security).

And the recent statements of Willy Claes? Mr Van Miert's reply: "It is necessary to choose priorities, but organizing solidarity remains the biggest problem."

8946

CSO: 3100



## SP PLANS POLITICAL CONGRESS IN SEPTEMBER

Brussels KNACK in Dutch 10 Jul 80 pp 16

[Text] The General Council of the Flemish socialists made an evaluation of government performance at a closed meeting last weekend. Meanwhile it was decided to organize a political congress at the end of September to investigate the state of affairs and eventually make a decision about it. SP [Socialist Party] chairman, Karel van Miert made no secret of the fact that his party has definite objections about government performance until now, but he also thought there were several positive features to single out. He mentioned, among others, the fight against tax evasion (although it is not at all clear what SP secretary of state for finance, Freddy Willockx will be able to accomplish in this matter), the maintenance of indexing, and the structural reforms included in the Budget Law. A number of difficult problems are held out in prospect for autumn, among others, in connection with the 1981 budget and social security. Meanwhile the question of atomic missiles is becoming a sensitive subject. According to the SP, a decision on the matter must be certainly postponed until after the summer vacation. As is known, Belgium's final decision on the subject must be announced at the NATO summit in Ankara, but as a result of the fall of the Martens I government, one thing and another was delayed. Minister of foreign affairs, Charles Ferdinand Nothomb, PSC [Social Christian Party] has, it is true, promised a parliamentary debate about this, but, on the other hand, he allows no doubt to exist about the fact that Belgium must back up the NATO decision to install missiles.

8490

CS0: 3105

## SP PLEADS FOR PLURALISTIC FLANDERS

Brussels KNACK in Dutch 16 Jul 80 pp 16

[Text] A Flemish festival was organized, on the occasion of 11 July, for the first time since World War II, on Friday last week at the Brussels Grand'Place. Rik Boel, SP [Socialist Party], chairman of the Netherlands Cultural Council, gave a speech at the City Hall, in connection with it, well suited for the occasion, in which he opposed, among other things, an expansion of the facilities and advocated the development of a pluralistic Flanders. For him this pluralism must be structurally built in Flemish institutions, thus implicitly referring to the problems involved with the cultural agreement. This last subject was also brought up in the speech on 11 July of Minister Mark Galle (SP) of the Flemish community in Sint Niklaas. In Aalst, PVV [Party of Liberty and Progress] chairman, Willy De Clercq, emphasized the need for dualism in future Belgium state structures, although several participants in that Golden Spurs Celebration thought that "a super Fleming, preferring French to be the main language, and a native of Ghent," like De Clercq, has little right to speak on such an occasion. At the Golden Spurs Celebration in Kortrijk, it came to incidents with the local section of the young socialists who protested against the fact that figures such as Flemish group chairman, Karel Dilen and VMO [Flemish Militant Order] leader, Bert Ericsson spoke. Thirty-seven demonstrators were rounded up for a while by the national police.

The "Association for the Advancement of Brussels" retracted last Friday its decision made several days before to delete the mention of the Belgian Revolution of 23 to 28 September from the poster. Previously Flemish extremist groups had threatened they would kick up a row to destroy these commemorations. However, the organizers obtained certain guarantees officially and from private institutions to allow the commemoration to take place peacefully.

## PURCHASE OF COBRA ANTITANK INFANTRY VEHICLES NEGOTIATED

Brussels KNACK in Dutch 16 Jul 80 pp 16-17

[Text] While the ground forces are trying to purchase new Dauphin antitank helicopters (6.8 billion francs) for the benefit of the Walloon aircraft industry, without bids by competitors, defense minister, Charles Poswick, PRL [Party of Liberty and Reform] wants to obtain permission to conclude a private agreement with ACEC [Charleroi Electrical Engineering Shops] for the purchase of 150 additional armored infantry vehicles of the Cobra type (4 billion francs). For last year when, in spite of all doubts, a decision was made in favor of the partial production in Belgium by Belgian Mechanical Fabrication (ASCO [expansion unknown], Cockerill and Brussel-Lambert) of 1039 armored infantry tracked vehicles (24 billion francs) of the American type, the selection of 150 additional units was postponed until the end of 1980, to give an opportunity to a Belgian produced vehicle.

Although the Cobra was never especially mentioned in the final documents, it was already rather obviously clear in making the American choice (among other things, in the Commission for the Supervision of Government Orders) that the additional option was kept open for the Cobra and not for the prospective armored vehicles of Bekaert, Beherman-Demoen or Bourgeoise and Nivelles. The more so since the Walloon socialists have supported the Cobra from the beginning and the ACEC management, including the General Manager Dalcq, moreover began to praise the vehicle as "a Flemish armored vehicle," when he was introduced on 5 October 1978 for the first time and intentionally only to the Flemish press in Ghent, where the Cobra would even be assembled.

ACEC then demanded of the government that it be allowed to produce at least a Cobra per day and meanwhile be allowed to sell a few units to national defense "because of the national situation in the world market."

The Cobra is a tracked vehicle which initially is set up around an electric drive system, which ACEC began 2 weeks ago, and in which a diesel engine supplies a generator, which in its turn, provides the motors in the vehicle's rearmost wheels with the necessary driving force.

8490

CSO: 3105

## BRIEFS

STATE OF STEEL INDUSTRY--A week ago last Sunday, Minister of Economic Affairs Claes declared on RTBF (Belgian Radio Broadcasting and Television) in the program "Get Your Bearings," that the condition of the steel industry was so crucial that various billions in additional state support would be necessary to allow the short term survival of the steel sector. The reaction of the steel industry itself was reported several days later. Spokesmen did not understand the minister's statement, since the steel enterprises themselves have not made a single request for additional credits. Cockerill also declared that no stop-gap loans were necessary. Later in the week the social economic central council approved a number of investment portfolios in steel enterprises. It involved a total of 13 billion francs, of which the state is advancing 6.5 billion. On that occasion, it was confirmed that the private groups which previously had joined the state in large-scale agreements are holding back regarding the release of the promised investment billions. The communist newspaper LE DRAPEAU ROUGE pointed out bitterly Monday that apparently it is easier for the financial groups to grant loans to South Korea than make investment commitments in their own country. [Text] 8490 [Brussels KNACK in Dutch 16 Jul 80 p 16] 8490

CSO: 3103

## KGB WORKS TO INFLUENCE POLITICS THROUGH PEACE GROUPS

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 6 Jul 80 pt 11 p 4

[Article by Mogens Auning]

[Text] The Soviet Union has put agents of the KGB [State Security Committee] in place in an intelligence offensive in West Europe, including Denmark. The purpose is to find friends to be able to influence the decision-making process.

For the past year the Soviet Union has been carrying on an extensive propaganda campaign in secret in a number of western NATO countries--including Denmark.

The strategy is to acquire influence through which it will be possible to affect the political decision-making processes. It is noteworthy that the Soviet Union has involved its intelligence agency, the KGB, in the propaganda work.

The key word is "world peace," and the tactic in the offensive is to find friends. Those with whom contact is sought are people through whom it will be possible to exert a hidden political influence. It is politicians, opinion molders, and leading people in, e.g., the peace movements that have first priority in this more or less secret work.

## Operation Knife and Fork

The KGB's chief requisite in this campaign is knife and fork. "Chance" acquaintances from conferences or receptions are contacted through luncheon invitations and meetings in private homes. The agents seek to gain the confidence of the persons they are interested in, in order to influence them and finally to exert a certain control over them.

These activities are especially directed toward persons in NATO countries where the government is not too strong on the questions of interest to the Soviet Union. Great efforts have been made by the Russians, e.g., to get Danish personalities to give expression to views that might steer



political developments in Denmark in a direction that was regarded as advantageous to Moscow. That has happened in connection with Denmark's attitude toward NATO's plans for replacement of the intermediate-distance rockets in West Europe. About the question of possible stockpiling of heavy NATO materiel in Denmark. The debate on Danish participation in the Moscow Olympics has also had the KGB agents' attention. Lively activity may also be expected when the defense compromise negotiations are resumed in the fall.

Preservation of peace and the threat to it that emanates from "NATO's atomic weapons build-up" are the catch words used when the Russian agents seek contact with private individuals or organizations.

A very important part of the Russian intelligence offensive is therefore probably directed toward people who are active within the Danish peace movements.

When such strong pressure was put on the government in the fall that Denmark took a separate position in NATO on the question of modernization of the alliance's intermediate-distance rockets, in any case great activity was carried on with the "Cooperative Committee for Peace and Security."

That committee is the most influential of the Danish peace movements. It calls itself "non-partisan," but it is often accused of being communist-dominated. The committee has connections with the communist-dominated "World Peace Council" and the "European Committee for Security and Cooperation." The cooperative committee's membership includes representatives of the DKP [Communist Party of Denmark], SF [Socialist People's Party], "Catholic Workers' Action Group," "Military and Conscientious Objectors' Association," and a sprinkling of traditional pacifists.

#### Russians Go to Conference

In the fall the cooperative committee was engaged in putting strong pressure on the government for Denmark to say no to the rocket modernization. The demand was supported with a collection of signatures which got the adherence of a very large number of persons.

At the same time the committee was at a hearing in Copenhagen. It did not get much media coverage in Denmark, but it did in the Soviet Union.

The Russian embassy in Copenhagen had sent one of its third secretaries, Vladimir Merkulov, to the hearing as an observer. The Russian television had a reportage group on the spot. The APN ["News" Press Agency] correspondent in Copenhagen, Aleksander Polekhov, and the TASS [Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union] correspondent Revyakain, were there, as was Valeriy Kislov, the correspondent of the young communists' paper KOMSOMOL'SKAYA PRAVDA. All of them made the greatest efforts to show that the hearing represented the Danish people's opinion on the rocket question.

Since the rocket hearing the "Cooperative Committee for Peace and Security" has been lying low. But in April a conference was held in the Svanemølle



Hall on "Denmark's Security Policy." There was also discussion there of activities surrounding the defense negotiations in the fall.

On the other hand, the committee did not find it worthwhile to take a position on the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

"In order not to spread our forces, we have concentrated on preserving peace in Europe," Annemarie Løppenthin, the secretary of the committee, told BERLINGSKE TIDENDE.

A month later the cooperative committee's view of the invasion of Afghanistan came out in a statement by Meta Ditzel, a teacher, former Radical member of the Folketing. She is a member of the board of the cooperative committee.

In an interview with VEJLE AMTS FOLKEBLAD she said that the invasion of Afghanistan might be regarded as a natural consequence of the establishment of the American NATO rockets in West Europe.

#### Army of Demonstrators To Be Raised

Meta Ditzel says in the same article that the cooperative committee and she are working to raise an "army" of demonstrators who will go into action all over the country at the same time.

The "army" will go into action in the fall if a new defense compromise is reached that permits "foreign relief troops" to move into Denmark in time of war, according to the article.

"The most effective political weapon is public opinion. And that is what the Cooperative Committee for Peace and Security is using in earnest," said Meta Ditzel when she opened a local chapter of the organization in Egtved, Jutland.

The international guidance on the Afghanistan problem showed up back in the spring when the same thoughts to which Meta Ditzel was giving expression through the cooperative committee turned up in various places in West Europe. They were stated, e.g., in a proclamation by the communist party in the FRG.

A number of West German newspapers published a statement in April by "The German Committee for Peace, Disarmament, and Cooperation." It was stated there that "The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan was an understandable response to the military strategy of the United States, which is striving for a position of military superiority in connection with China and NATO."

The West German cooperative committee is supporting a campaign with the aid of which "the population will be mobilized against the American policy of confrontation and the resulting arms build-up in NATO."

That is reminiscent in some degree of the thoughts here in Denmark concerning a nationwide army of demonstrators.

## MARXIST PARTIES TROUBLED BY INTERNAL CONFLICTS

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE AFTEN in Danish 4 Jul 80 p 3

[Article by Hans J. Poulsen]

[Text] This summer there has been a wild lurching about in the left wing's political and union ranks. During the past month attention has been focused chiefly on two confrontations: the strike at LAND OG FOLK, which kept the paper from being published for 10 days or so, and the clash among the Leftist Socialists, in which Preben Wilhjem got the better of two fellow members of the Folketing group. BERLINGSKE AFTEN summarizes.

What is looked upon with disfavor in other political parties is welcome in the Leftist Socialist Party. In that revolutionary party the formation of factions is the order of the day; indeed, it appears to be laid down in the regulations that splitting into various groupings is permitted.

The fact that thus far this has not resulted in fragmentation of the collectively led party may be due to the fact that by the so-called "intro-schooling" of the party's novices and by successful congresses it has been possible to keep the disunity indoors. The VS [Leftist Socialist Party] is not a party that one can simply join. There is both coarse and fine screening. For that reason the disproportion between the number of voters and the number of members is greater than in any other party. Only 2,500 to 3,000 have membership cards for this elitist party which got 116,000 votes in the last Folketing election.

#### Wilhjem Versus the Unions

The ball for a party contest has been tossed out by Preben Wilhjem, member of the Folketing and the party's unelected leader. That happened a month ago, when he let it be known in the paper VS/INTERN DEBAT that two of the party's six members of the Folketing, bookbinder Kurt Hansen and electrician Carl Thio Tyroll, both from the Union Combined List faction, should be replaced. Wilhjem was successful in his undertaking; neither

of the two will be put up in a safe district if there is a Folketing election within the next year.

Wilhjelm's motivation for the attack was that both Kurt Hansen and Tyrolh assign such a low priority to the Folketing work that the party runs the risk of dropping out of the Folketing altogether if the Union Combined List gets the upper hand in the party. Specifically, Wilhjelm complained of negligence in the job market and social policy fields.

The article by Wilhjelm was also characterized by anxiety lest the whole of the present Folketing group drop out simultaneously as a result of the rotation principle adopted by the Leftist Socialists, under which nobody can be a member of the Folketing for a consecutive period of more than 7 years.

Wilhjelm trotted out his main argument at a time that was not chosen at random. Each year the VS makes up a "Top Twenty List" by vote of its intro-schooled members. The top scorers on that list are thus guaranteed one year in advance the safest electoral districts in the country.

The factional fight intensified after Wilhjelm expressed himself so unambiguously. The Top Twenty vote, which always before had been carried out in secrecy, all at once became a public affair. SOCIALISTISK DAGBLAD (SF [Socialist People's Party]), which calls itself "the open newspaper of the left wing," enlarged its printing in the hope of warding off the traditional summer slump by taking readers away from INFORMATION. The factions were offered space in its columns.

The division into factions is reflected in the 21-member executive committee. Group 79 has 8 places, Union Combined List 5, the Band of 6 has 4, and KF (Kritisk Majoritet) 4. On the other hand, the VS-R (Advisory Group) is not represented on the executive committee, which is quite surprising, as it numbers among its members the two most outstanding VS politicians, Preben Wilhjelm and Steen Folke.

There were 34 candidates put up for the Top Twenty voting, and not more than 20 nor less than 10 persons were to be voted for. The long list of candidates carried the names in alphabetical order, with Wilhjelm at the bottom, and the groupings around the Union Combined List hoped he would still be there after the 2 weeks' voting.

Erik Sigsgaard, a former VS politician, got into the debate with a comment that it is a "democratic advance that the VS is now openly discussing whether certain Folketing members mentioned by name are qualified for re-election"...and it is a good thing that its (i.e., the party's; edit.) popularly elected [representatives] cannot continue to sit in parliament until they become fixtures there and completely lose contact with the people."

In VS/INTERN DEBAT Preben Wilhjelm contributed yet another article to the voting, in the form of a stock-taking of 12 years of the Leftist Socialist

Party. In it he noted for the first time in the party's history differences of opinion that were "antagonistic," i.e. irreconcilable and impossible to accommodate within one party.

"My own concept of the party is still roomier than most Leftist Socialists'," wrote Wilhjem, who concluded by emphasizing the need for the party's program to be made more precise, even if that involved some "sloughing off."

"Heard to itself and snot to itself," ran Wilhjem's challenging opening remark before the counting of the Top Twenty votes began. The general impression was that Wilhjem was playing for high stakes.

But he landed on his feet again, it was found when the result of the count was available. And he had accomplished his aim: to put his Folketing colleagues Kurt Hansen and Tyrol down so emphatically that they cannot be reelected to the Folketing if there is an election within the next year.

But everything has its cost, and the voting had its cost for Wilhjem, too. From being the undisputed number 1 on the list last year, he became number 3 this time. But the first place was occupied by his closest ally in the party, Steen Folke, MP. A new name turned up in second place: Karen Jespersen, journalist, from Group 79. She, too, had to pay a price: the newspaper INFORMATION's editorial staff voted 17 to 11 (with one blank) that as a candidate for the Folketing, Karen Jespersen must no longer write for the paper, to which she has been a contributor on union matters. The Punic war on Børge Outzes old paper ended with her reluctantly taking the assignment of editing the paper's debate page.

The fourth place was won by Mikael Waldorff, of Wilhjem and the People's Brigade, the fifth by Marian Pittelkow, of Group 79, and the sixth by Ralf Pittelkow, of Group 79. If the election were held now, these would thus be the six that would in all probability get to represent the VS in the Folketing, if we assume an unchanged number of seats. Folketing members Anne Grete Holmsgaard (number 8), Carl Thio Tyrol (number 14), and Kurt Hansen (number 17) would go out.

According to INFORMATION the VS executive committee would not comment on the result, since "The figures speak for themselves." The figures, which must be taken with reservations until the result of a final count is available, were published in SOCIALISTISK DAGBLAD, which reported that Steen Folke got 765 votes, Karen Jespersen 752, a figure that Wilhjem and Waldorff are very close to. Thio Tyrol got 434 votes and Kurt Hansen 410.

The VS has no women's quota of any kind in its party work, and only one woman was elected out of six in the present Folketing group. In this the VS is far behind its closest competitor on the left wing, the Socialist People's Party, which out of 11 Folketing members has 7 women--somewhat impolitely known in the Christiansborg as "the cackle club." The SF has

a provision in its party by-laws that 40 percent of the members of the executive committee *shall* be women, and there are special women's groups in the party and a women's secretariat.

In November the Leftist Socialists will hold their 11th party congress, and a debate on a women's quota will be on the agenda. The top scorer among the VS's women candidates, Karen Jespersen, has given BERLINGSKE AFTEN her views on the question of "women and politics":

"In the case of a woman and a man that are equally qualified, we'll do what we can to support the woman. But I will not put the fact that she is a woman above what she stands for politically."

#### When LAND OG FOLK Wrote Firing Notices

The 8-week union-political fight around the communist daily LAND OG FOLK (circulation 10,550) is another facet of the midsummer conflicts on the left wing. For the first time in its almost 40-year history the party's organ in Dronningens Tværgade in Copenhagen was hit by a strike. It was set off by the fact that the communist party as publisher of the paper had acted as a "hard-as-bone" employer in writing firing notices to five lithographers.

The dilemma for the class struggle's mouthpiece was obvious: "Internally the DKP [Communist Party of Denmark] plays the part of a capitalist with a stovepipe hat and with a fat cigar in the corner of his mouth," SOCIALISTISK DAGBLAD (SF) said graphically.

The firing was done with a reference to "profitability analyses," but the lithographers (organized in their own union and not members of the communist-leaning Danish Typographic Union) felt that there was a question of political firings, a decided "Berufsverbot" [German: prohibition from practicing one's profession].

#### Name-Calling Between the Fenceposts

The most vigorous expression of the agitation came into use in the union and political clashes that occurred after 4 May, when the dismissals of the five lithographers were announced. "Dirty methods," "hysterical smear campaign," political gangsterism," and "tremendous fraud" were among the abusive terms that flew between the fenceposts.

The dreadful word *strike*, which up to now had been a town in Russia as far as the communists' Danish paper was concerned, turned up as a result of the paper's own explanation of the course of events on 13 June. On that unlucky day the sub-editor of the paper was met with a sign inscribed "strike." Three lithographers had gone home in the middle of the production "without the slightest explanation." According to the communist newspaper the work stoppage was "in the meaning of the labor laws, in definite conflict with all existing contracts and agreements" entered into between the lithographers and LAND OG FOLK.



For some 10 days the DKP had to resign itself to the fact that its link with the membership was lacking. The central committee found it catastrophic if more weaknesses should cause internal paralysis in the party, which at the last Folketing election, as is well known, lost the rostrum it had had in the Folketing since 1973. The conflict with the Seamen's Union and the expulsion of union chairman Preben Møller Hansen, the founding of the KAP [Communist Workers' Party] and the Common Course Club, and the unsuccessful negotiations on the founding of a broad over-all cartel with the typographers in a central position exemplify the decentralizations taking place in an otherwise centrally oriented party.

On Midsummer Eve, however, party chairman Jørgen Jensen felt that he had good news. In a bonfire speech on Utterslev Moor he informed the comrades that a "new communist newspaper would be on the streets" the next day.

It turned out that it was the North Jutland young communists' monthly FOLKETS KAMP that was now being launched as the DKP's daily. At its launching they forgot to indicate the place of printing, which is illegal. Later it came out that Dansk Avis Tryk [Danish Newspaper Press] at Hornslet on Djursland was the midwife. After only a few days, however, the effort had to be given up in the face of accusations of carrying on a "conflict-burdened work."

At Hornslet the DKP managed to get a paper printed for 2 days, namely 24 and 25 June. The third number of FOLKETS KAMP came out in Dronningens Tværgade, at LAND OG FOLK's own press, Terpo Tryk. The reproduction work was done, it was stated, "out in the town."

After an interlude with LO [Danish Federation of Trade Unions] as mediator with three proposed compromises, which the lithographers' union rejected, on 26 June negotiating contacts took place directly between the lithographers and LAND OG FOLK. They led to agreement on a compromise providing that four lithographers are dismissed and that LAND OG FOLK remits 114,000 kroner to the lithographers' union "in full and final settlement of the matter."

That the case did not come before the Labor Court was due to LAND OG FOLK's own rationalization after the fact, for the DKP viewed it as an episode in a political fight and considered that the opponents during a proceeding in the Labor Court "might mislead and give the action the character of a union conflict."

Since publication of the party organ was again ensured, the DKP leadership stated that a solution by "fraternal conflict within the working class" had been avoided "in spite of numerous provocations."

#### Chairman in the Soviet Union

Saturday of last week, 28 June, LAND OG FOLK was again on the streets in its usual format, but party chairman Jørgen Jensen did not get to read it. He was in the Soviet Union to negotiate with a printing customer that

provides the LAND OG FOLK press with half its gross business. The client had become worried over the situation in the Danish Communist Party's technical divisions and needed to be reassured.

LAND OG FOLK, which according to party secretary Poul Emanuel's statements to BERLINGSKE AFTEN needs an annual grant of 6 million kroner to come out, suffered a serious economic loss because of the conflict. Income from single-copy sale and advertising was lost.

Subscribers have been asked to pay the whole subscription price "in spite of the break in delivery." Support campaigns have collected 50,000 kroner. The collections are still being taken.

The Danish communists admit to having suffered a "loss of speed," but pin their faith on a "fantastic union solidarity--in the form of hard cash."

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CSO: 3106



## PCF POLITBURO MEMBER DEFENDS 'SOCIALISM'S' ACCOMPLISHMENTS

Paris L'HUMANITE in French 26 Jun 80 p 9

[Text] Media campaigns--if they still merit the name--against socialist countries are not a new thing. In an effort not to speak of the bottom line in the capitalist countries, the media are eager to go see what is happening in the "East." News analysis in either area has never been known for its objectivity. But for some time, and more specifically as the progress of the people in the world was asserting itself, the most glaring falsehood became the privileged weapon to which both the reactionary forces and the Socialist Party resorted. Thus we witnessed the proliferation, LE FIGARO to LE MATIN, from LE MONDE to L'UNITE and other weeklies, of numerous articles attempting to describe the so-called "crisis" in which the "communist" countries were said to be caught. Based on issues which the socialist countries are currently stressing--improvement of productivity, work efficiency, better use of raw materials, etc.--the authors of these "analyses" were forming, for French public opinion, an image of socialism which could be summed up as follows: they too are failing. And many add: and furthermore they are deprived of their freedom!

We must reestablish the facts based on several examples.

#### The Right To Work

Take the right to work. We know that in France today more than 1.5 million people suffer from unemployment. This is an evil which is unknown in socialist countries. As no one is able to produce contradictory /facts/ [in boldface], they proceed by suggestion: there would thus be the "camouflaged" unemployment in the USSR where people are paid to do nothing... there "will probably" soon be layoffs in Hungary....

Guaranteeing full employment in countries where equal salaries are guaranteed to men and women, and where women are encouraged to work, is not an easy thing. This is, however, the situation in socialist countries today. No falsehood can alter this reality, and I know many unemployed French workers who would certainly like to be able to think about productivity, efficiency, when they are wondering whether they will eat tomorrow!

what the party in power in France accuses the socialist countries of is, no doubt, not making their plants profitable by layoffs, by speeding up work rates.... Yes, the semiskilled worker in Moscow, Budapest or Prague works more "slowly" than his counterpart in France and discusses his work place! let those who think this is scandalous say so frankly!

To continue to develop the economy of the socialist countries now needs an improvement in the quality of work, on the basis of its accomplishments. No "boss" has the power to "impose" this: it will be achieved through discussion among the workers themselves, involved as they are directly in the result of their work. And this must be accomplished without disrupting anyone's standard of living as is done here. It is surely this example which is so dangerous to the capitalist's profit which is inspiring the false media campaign!

### Standard of Living

Take the issue of standard of living. On this topic also falsification generally supersedes discussion. Increased "austerity in the East in 1980" is attacked and then pursued by all the press. Since the statement is accompanied by more "measured" development--it must be recognized that this only means slowed-down growth--they simply "forget" to distinguish between national production and standard of living. For, in /no/ [in boldface] socialist country was there a drop in the standard of living in 1979; nor will there be one in 1980.

It is in /France/ [in boldface] that, according to national figures, blue-collar workers' wages decreased 1.4 percent in 1979, office workers' 0.8 percent, and minimum wage employees' 1.3 percent. There were indeed "price increases" in several socialist countries. But reason must lead the "observers" to some details.

The first, sometimes mentioned in half of a sentence, is that the prices in question have been frozen, often for about 10 years. This is unlike the "orange card" in /France/ [in boldface] for transportation which will go up 21.4 percent on July 1st: it has done so regularly at least once a year since it has been in existence.

The second detail which the media scrupulously conceals is that /whenever/ [in boldface] there are price increases they are accompanied by wage increases particularly at the lower levels, and tax measures to compensate. In fact, in the socialist countries the standard of living has continued to rise. They do not have inflation because private capital has disappeared and the economy is actually planned. Everyone eats his fill in Cuba, a developing country. Can we say as much of a worker on minimum wage who today earns exactly 2,072.60 French francs (after social security deductions)?

It is in France that they are trying to dismantle the social security system, while in the "East", as they say, health is free for everyone. It is in France that they are trying to raise the RLM and other rents

and charges again. In the USSR and in the GDR a worker spends no more than 1-5 percent of his wages for rent. In France the price tags are always changing. Who will report that in the USSR they print a price right on a pair of shoes, for example, because it does not change?

It is in France that millions of workers, young people and children will be deprived of vacations this summer. Thanks to their unions, plants, offices, or laboratories, Soviet or Hungarian families will be leaving to vacation for modest sums, and real vacations will be offered to all the children, whatever their parents' trade or profession. In the city where I live near Paris, there are many kids who will spend the summer in the midst of buildings.

From Giscard d'Estaing to Barre and from Chirac to Francois Mitterrand, this is what they are all trying to hide: while more than 18 million French workers live in poverty--to mention only the most insupportable aspects of the power policy--there are countries where life is pleasant for everyone, even if progress remains to be made.

Faced with fables from both the right and the "left" (L'UNITE does not hesitate to mention the "USSR's incapability of resolving its economic, political and social problems") we have already had the chance to sum up the truth of the situation. Never mind that. They create caricatures to facilitate their lies. Here we are accused of describing the socialist countries as a paradise.... It would suffice, however, to reread the minutes of our 23d Congress and all our writings and speeches since then to realize that this is not the case. We know that building a new society is not easy. We know that the original historical, political, social and cultural conditions are a heavy burden. It was, moreover, by wanting to sweep them away a little too quickly that many errors or crimes were committed. We have drawn our lessons from them. And we congratulate ourselves that today the people who are building socialism are joining forces with their parties in ways that they themselves define to implement a new phase of development in which the appeal to the responsibility of the individual takes on primary importance. The word "self-management" or the idea it represents, with each person translating it as a function of the concrete reality, is making its way in the "East"....

Obviously everything does not happen at once. There are delays, obstacles and mistakes which slow down this movement. Administrative measures are still sometimes substituted for the required political and ideological struggle. We have admitted this and will repeat it whenever necessary.

#### Democracy

However, regarding democracy also, a brief summary of the facts is needed. It is in France that the CRS (state security police) are sent to destroy the free radio in the North and in Picardy, and that a young student, "guilty" of having walked down a Paris street after his music class, where two hours earlier demonstrators were doing their work under the callous eye of the police, is jailed with common criminals... The working class in socialist countries is involved at all levels in decisions made on education, training, sports, community life, economic priorities, foreign

policy.... Discussions are often lively, there are sometimes delays, interruptions--which, by the way, do not always come from the top--because it is not easy to be "revolutionary" at all times, in all places, for all people.... The Marxists that we are do not deny the contradictions, they see in them the moving force of history, of a history which, in the socialist countries, is moving in a good direction, the direction of human liberation.

## Culture

Culture, intellectuals? In France less than 1 percent of the national budget is devoted to culture. But it is in the USSR, the GDR, and other socialist countries that works by French authors are most widely published and distributed! In these same countries admission to the opera or the theater is ridiculously low, while in France most of the workers have never set foot in either place. In France barely more than 10 percent of the sons and daughters of working people attend a university. It was in regard to the USSR that an American professor, Mr Wirazup, had to recognize that everyone completed ten years of education, and to salute the remarkable results in mathematics, due to a "concerted effort to obtain mass education of unequalled quality."

It is the socialist countries who are currently producing a variety of cinematographic works of high quality and great diversity which each day make the rantings against a so-called stifled culture more ridiculous. And what is to be said about the place given to the cultures and national languages developed in each region of the immense nation the USSR comprises? The Soviet Armenians also have some facts to face their capitalist "brothers" with.

I will not say much about sports. No doubt the "commentators" will find medical or psychological reasons for the certain successes of the many athletes from socialist countries at the Moscow Olympics. It is better for the country they serve for them to mention this rather than the number of stadiums, pools and gymnastics teachers we have here!

## Foreign Relations

Another angle of "attack": foreign relations. They speak to us of Soviet imperialism--except for L'UNITE whose "leftist" image obliges it to discuss "the USSR, a sub-imperialism?...." The facts, however, remain. Who imposed trade limitations? It was the United States, the capitalist countries. Why do they not mention more often in the "well-informed" press that there has been in existence since 1949 a coordinating committee with headquarters in Paris and membership including the United States, the Western European countries, NATO members, and Japan, which has prepared a list of more than 400 products which the members of the committee have agreed not to export to "communist" countries? And the media then shamelessly hold forth on the "lack of trade between the East and the West", the blame for which would of course fall upon the socialist countries? Who has the words "boycott" and "restrictions" upon their lips



if not the United States and their allies. Who dares to use the weapon of food against the Vietnamese people whom they vainly tried to wipe out with bombs, napalm and defoliants, if not again the United States? It is not the USSR which has a military base on Cuba; it is the United States which has one at Guantanamo against the will of the Cuban people.

It is once again the United States which maintains half a million men outside its borders. If, despite the current tensions, peaceful coexistence and detente dominate international relations, it is neither to the United States nor to the capitalist countries, who have always dragged their feet in this area, that we owe it: it is rather to the socialist countries' consistent policy of peace and disarmament. As for relations with the developing countries with whom Mr Carter likes to sympathize it is the crisis of capitalism which is preventing their development and keeping them, even pushing them further, into difficulty and misery. The socialist countries have a completely different policy.

It takes blindness or rather the anti-communist fervor of L'UNITE to claim that it is the Soviets just as much as the Americans who want the new international division of labor. The socialist countries are already maintaining a new type of relations with the developing countries. They are based on mutual advantage, economic equality, non-interference in internal affairs, and respect for the sovereignty of the people. This is aid to development, and not pilfering of resources. The USSR buys Cuban sugar at well above the world market price, but sells Cuba petroleum at a price which is much lower than the one set by the large oil companies: where is the "imperialism" in this transaction? It was considerable aid from the USSR which enabled Somalia to settle tens of thousands of people, thus putting an end to endemic famine. During this time, the heads of the largest capitalist countries were appealing to the world's conscience to resolve hunger problems, while they continued to exploit the people....

No, decidedly, the glaring falsehoods, the bitter articles, the venomous declarations which are all alike, whether they originate from the most reactionary right or from the Socialist party, cannot hide the reality: beyond an extraordinary diversity, there has been in all the socialist countries a real transformation in the capacity of individuals, or people, to take their places in national life, to realize their goals, to be involved in all that affects them. And this is indeed to be considered an asset of socialism itself.

Much remains to be done, criticisms may arise, and we are keeping our eyes wide open; but, decidedly, the only clear, balanced, and sincere evaluation is that socialism is a good thing for the people who are building it: it is a good thing for us.

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CSO: 3100

## NATIONAL ENERGY POLICY DISCUSSED IN DETAIL

Paris L'EXPANSION in French 23 May 80 pp 75-81

[Article by Jean Boissonat: "Energy: the Real Debate"]

[Text] Capital is as rare as oil. Where will it be most effective? Pierre Desprairies (Plan) and Michel Rolant (CFDT [French Democratic Confederation of Labor]) state their views.

In France, the debates on energy tend to concentrate too much on nuclear power. Not that development of this energy source is a secondary matter; but it sometimes obscures very important problems, at the forefront of which is energy-saving. Now the government has just decided on the broad outlines of its energy policy up to 1990. It is an especially ambitious policy, since it provides both for a big savings effort, a considerable reduction in use of oil, and development of the use of coal, gas and--to a lesser extent--new types of energy.

This policy surprised people because the preparatory work for the Eighth Plan had shown the difficulties of lowering consumption below 90 million tons of oil in 1990, whereas the government is setting, for that year, a range of 68 million to 80 million tons. The CFDT, for its part, published, at nearly the same moment when the government fixed its program, a series of proposals on energy with 1990 in view. These proposals differ from the government's orientation on several important points.

Thus, in order to get this fundamental debate going again, we brought together two of the personalities who have done the most thinking, in France, about the problems of energy--on the one hand, Pierre Desprairies, 59, a former colleague of Pierre Guillaumat (the "French Mattei"), a former director of the UGP [General Petroleum Union] and of the ERAP [expansion unknown], the current president of the French Petroleum Institute and chairman of the Energy Committee of the Eighth Plan; and on the other hand, Michel Rolant, 46, the official in charge of the economic sector in the CFDT. Both of them reply freely to the government program. This confrontation brings out an often misunderstood fact: the shortage of energy is equally a shortage of capital. It is not solely a matter of substituting one source of energy for another--nuclear power for oil, for example. It is also a matter of manag-

ing as well as possible that other rare resource, money. Thus it is that in the matter of energy-saving, we are going into a phase in which one may not be content simply to reduce the outlays; it is henceforth necessary to make massive investments in order to achieve new progress.

Michel Rolant wonders whether nuclear power--the energy form that devours the most capital--is not here in competition with energy-saving. Pierre Despairies does not believe it possible--or desirable--to reduce the nuclear program, but he considers that the Eighth Plan will have to provide for a calculated program of investments in energy-saving, in the absence of which our present ambitions would be vain. Finally, the real debate on energy is opened! What is anticipated in order to have all the French people participate in this debate through their elected representatives and all of the intermediate entities?

L'EXPANSION: What hypothesis of economic growth are you working on in order to construct a 10-year energy program?

Pierre Despairies: On the government's hypotheses--that is, growth of 3 to 4 percent per year. It may be considered that the stronger is growth, the more means will there be for financing the investments that will make it possible to save energy. That is, for each percentage point of growth, less energy will be needed. Today, when production increases by 1 percent, the energy needs grow by 0.8 percent. In 1990, we should be between 0.8 and 0.7, and maybe less.

Michel Rolant: We too have adopted the government's growth assumptions, while at the same time hoping that the rate will be as high as possible. And in particular, we ask for a different type of growth, one that consumes less energy. Furthermore, a voluntarist energy-saving policy would make it possible to accelerate growth.

L'EXPANSION: Do you consider that what has been done in France up to the present in the matter of energy-saving is bold, or rather insufficient?

Pierre Despairies: Up to the present, there has been a lot of very good talk; organisms such as the Energy-Savings Agency have been set up; people have been urged to save, and they have been helped to do so; certain progress has been made, but a great deal more remains to be done. We are arriving at the stage where in order to make greater savings, a lot of investment has to be made. This costs more and it takes longer.

L'EXPANSION: In your opinion, has the approach been to do the easiest things?

Pierre Despairies: Yes. People have eased up on the accelerator, they have turned down their radiators a bit. It remains to build economical automobiles that also perform well, with fuel consumption reduced by 30 percent. People have to weatherstrip their houses and put in double glazing so as to have more heat while at the same time turning their radiators down a bit; all this costs a lot and takes time.



Michel Rolant: In our view, the government's decisions were taken too hastily, without even waiting for the committee for the Eighth Plan--chaired by Mr Desprairies--to finish its work.

There is neither boldness nor courage in this kind of attitude. It amounts to a bet, one that runs the strong risk of proving dangerous to the French economy. One does not exactly what the savings effort is going to concentrate on or what the sources of financing will be. Energy-saving, or rational use of energy--this is the vast "deposit" available on the national territory today. We are capable of doing this. But too little of public means is being devoted to it: the funds available to the Energy-Savings Agency is entirely insufficient--a few hundred million this year, whereas several billion would be necessary.

L'EXPANSION: Or is economizing necessary?

Pierre Desprairies: I would have preferred that the government wait until autumn to decide on its energy program for the next 10 years.

Even so, this energy-saving program seems to me rightly ambitious, since with a growth rate of 3 or 4 percent, a total consumption of 242 million tons-equivalent of oil (TEP) are arrived at in 1990. You too are ambitious, since the CFDT is counting on 236 million TEP in 1990.

Michel Rolant: It is a very ambitious figure, but it corresponds to what seems possible to us in the matter of needs, and therefore of savings. What we criticize in the government's program is mainly the internal breakdown among the different sources and forms of energy.

L'EXPANSION: What is the principal "deposit" as regards energy-savings?

Pierre Desprairies: Housing is where the most can be gained.

Michel Rolant: The only figure given by the government program has to do with the investments necessary for achieving the anticipated savings on industry's consumption: 60 billion. Who is going to finance it? As regards energy-saving in housing, we have calculated that it would cost between 6,000 and 9,000 francs per housing unit--that is, several billion per year if one wants to carry out an extensive insulation program. It is very necessary for financial mechanisms of a new type to be set up to cope with such expenditures! On this point, the government is practically mute.

Pierre Desprairies: You are right to underline this point. Effectively, the investment and financing will not be without difficulty. But this would also be a problem for any other program, including the one that you are advocating!

Michel Rolant: Certainly. But we are reducing the expenditures on nuclear power.

Pierre Desprairies: At present, an installed kilowatt costs 3,500 francs; the nuclear program has to be on the order of 5,000 megawatts per year, or about 20 billion francs per year. To this are added thermal power, hydro power, and distribution, which represents about 30 billion per year for electricity in 1985.

Michel Rolant: EDF [French Electric (Power) Company] can afford to invest 30 billion and to borrow two-thirds of it. But what company or local collectivity today can do this? There is indeed a problem of new mechanisms to be set up and of public intervention to be thought out, if only for the medium term. This is entirely conceivable, and it must also be achieved.

L'EXPANSION: If I understand rightly, Michel Rolant, there is a conflict between the fact that action is being taken to give priority to nuclear power--that is, to a technique that consumes a great deal of investment--and the fact that it is desired to achieve more energy savings in a phase when such savings are also going to require a great deal of capital. Is that so?

Michel Rolant: This is indeed what we are saying. All the eggs have been put in the same basket.

L'EXPANSION: And oil, in the coming 10 years?

Michel Rolant: Mr Desprairies is certainly the most competent person on this subject. The committee that he chairs sets the consumption objective of 90 million tons of oil in 1990. I note that the government takes 68 million TEP as its low assumption, and 80 million TEP as its high assumption. Now if one considers only the consumption forecasts for transportation in 1990! we have roughly 50 million TEP. Can consumption of petroleum products be lowered to such a point outside the framework of a transport policy--that is, greater use of the rail and river systems, etc--and particularly a policy on public transportation in the urban zones, which raises the problem of the ongoing use of the automobile? From this point of view, the government's objectives a bit shortsighted.

Pierre Desprairies: The government's objectives are ambitious. But I do not believe that they are unachievable. In an initial approximation, we had estimated that by reducing oil consumption to its minimum in the year 2000 --that is, limiting it to transportation and petrochemicals--we would have the 90 million-ton point in 1990. This necessarily implies an adaptation effort by the oil industry (to get more gasoline and diesel fuel out of the same volume of crude oil).

The real problem is this: will there be, between now and 1990, enough coal, nuclear power, new energy forms, and energy saving to replace oil if the latter is reduced to 70 or 80 million tons? I cannot answer this question. In principle, then, I agree with Mr Rolant--but with less scepticism than he has--when he says that it is an ambitious target.

As for predicting the oil situation during these 10 years--that is difficult indeed! I do not see how, between now and 1990, we can help having a great

strain on the oil supplies and a considerable price increase that presents the risk of an economic slowdown in the consumer countries. I do not see why the oil-producing countries, which have the wind at their backs, would not try to go to the limit of the customer's ability to pay. On the other hand, they want to make their capital--that is, their oil--last, which is normal. They want to manage to be suitably industrialized when they have no more oil. They consider this a matter that goes beyond the 40 or 50 years which they had first imagined. Throughout the coming years, then, they are going to try to reduce production to the minimum, especially the countries of the Arabian peninsula that we are living on: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the emirates.

L'EXPANSION: In your document, you speak of a price of \$55 per barrel (in current dollars) on the 1990 horizon.

Pierre Desprairies: No one can predict the future. A political or military accident in the Middle East might push the barrel price up to \$90 or \$100 for a time. This would bring about rationing in France as in all the other buyer countries. But I rule this kind of situation out of the scenarios on which we are trying to work, for it is in the realm of pure politics, and I do not know what to say about it.

Let us simply suppose that matters proceed without violent shocks. I think that under such conditions, prices should stabilize by 1990, for they will have risen so high that the alternative sources will have been developed and people will have been making energy-savings. We will therefore have a decade of adaptation. Such adaptation will not be completed in 1990, but will be well-advanced. The stabilization price should be closer to \$40 to \$50 per barrel than to \$80 to \$100. Because at \$80 (1980 dollars), the economies are blocked, and at that price, everyone will start producing energy in every way possible. If you take the most expensive liquid fuels--methanol made from biomass, oil from coal, assisted recovery of oil, which is extremely sophisticated--you arrive at prices no higher than \$40 to \$50. Counting in the equipment and labor costs at their maximum, this kind of price therefore appears to be the ceiling. But for all that, it should be pulled downward: at present, coal stagnates in the American deposits at the equivalent of \$6 to \$7 per barrel! It is not sold because there are no users.

L'EXPANSION: Hasn't too much time already been lost, since 1974, in development of alternative energy sources?

Pierre Desprairies: Of course. But there were no outlets. This is the problem with coal, for example. One must not count on people going back to coal-heating. I have done so myself, in the country, but because I am virtuous and because in my youth I got into the habit of carrying the buckets.

Michel Rolant: However, the experts say that coal is the energy of the 21st century! Therefore we must settle down to it starting now, and in particular, safeguarding national production and using coal for production of electricity.

L'EXPANSION: It is also said that it is the most polluting energy form.

Pierre Desprairies: A 15-percent surcharge should solve the pollution problems.

Michel Rolant: For us in the CFDT, our conviction is formed: it has to do with the evolution of the behavior of the countries that produce raw materials, as was the case in the 19th century with the working class in the process of organizing itself. We are in a historical movement, positive and irreversible. Because the peoples want to reappropriate to themselves the only resources at their disposal. Over the long haul, therefore, the increase in the price of oil and raw materials is absolutely irreversible.

L'EXPANSION: In 1990, we will need some 250 million TEP. If we have 70 to 90 million tons of oil, where are we going to find the difference?

Michel Rolant: In this regard, the CFDT's proposals are more logical and better-balanced than those of the government, which is betting mainly on the development of electricity consumption. But its assumptions on consumption are, in fact, the maximum assumptions made by EDF: 450 billion kilowatt-hours in 1990, with a formidable increase in consumption of electricity in the residential sector and in the tertiary sector--from 110 billion kilowatt-hours in 1980 to 210 billion in 1990: that is, a doubling. This is what we call the "all-electric."

Pierre Desprairies: I do not believe that EDF stormed the government and imposed its choices on it. Myself, having reflected as a citizen and as the head of a family, I believe that the electronuclear policy is the right one. I admit that the objective of 450 billion kilowatt-hours is ambitious. But I do not think that one may speak of "all-electric." It is an intensification of the consumption of electricity, because the government is starting from the principle that nuclear power is our only important and rapidly mobilizable national energy source. It is a postulate with which I agree. It is not an "all-electric" approach, since at 2000, electricity represents only 35 percent of the nation's total consumption of primary energy.

Michel Rolant: For low-temperature thermal uses, this is entirely aberrant in my view. Using electricity for heating is convenient but terribly wasteful. For such uses, we rightly consider that this is the area in which one can use the renewable or new energy sources: geothermal, solar energy, biomass, heat-recovery, etc. There does indeed have to be an area in which one can get the new technologies started up industrially. If it is not in this area, what one will it be in? Using electricity for heating and hot water is a dangerous absurdity. As for consumption connected with the uses specific to electricity--lighting, household appliances, office machines--they increase considerably in the official forecasts. Now these are consumption areas in which electricity does not replace the oil products, but in which it is added to the other energy expenditures. Consumption can be limited very strongly by the building of appliances that are less gluttonous.

We think that the electric program can be limited to around 350 billion kilowatthours for 1990--or 100 billion less--by more rational use of the various sources in function of their specific usages.

Pierre Desprairies: I would agree entirely with what Mr Rolant says if it were not a matter of nuclear electricity. For this is a national energy source.

Michel Rolant: In 1990, 80 percent of our coal should come from abroad; but our uranium too! Where is the security of supply?

Pierre Desprairies: Here, then, I no longer agree. One may not say, when speaking of the price per kilowatt, that nuclear power = fuel, uranium = oil. In a coal-fired kilowatt, 60 percent of the cost is accounted for by the fuel. For uranium, only half of which is imported, it is 10 to 15 percent of the cost. The foreign-exchange expenditure is therefore far lower. You say that there will be no more uranium available between 1990 and 2000. With our confirmed reserves of 100,000 tons in France, we can go to the year 2000. Some think--not without reason--that these reserves could reasonably be doubled if a thoroughgoing exploration of the territory of France were carried out. In addition, there are many uranium reserves to be identified in the world.

Michel Rolant: There is not only dependence on abroad. There is also, with regard to nuclear power, the technological risk. All our power plants are of the same type: PWR (Pressurized-Water Reactor). If an accident like Three-Mile Island were to occur, everything would have to be shut down.

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#### Three Scenarios for 1990

(in millions of tons- equivalent of oil)	Reference 1979	Giraud Plan	CFDT Plan	Hypotheses of the Plan <sup>1</sup>
Total energy consumption	194	242	236	243
Oil	109	68 to 80	81	90
Coal	34.5	28 to 33	46	37 to 47
Gas	23	37 to 42	46	30 to 44
Hydro	16	14	18	15
New energy forms	3	10 to 12	15	6
Nuclear	8.5	73	30	70

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1. Figures taken from an interim report by the Energy Committee for the Eighth Plan; the total exceeds 243 million tons because this figure assumes a considerable savings effort which could be difficult to achieve totally.
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This table makes it possible to compare the government's objectives for 1990 with today's reality as well as with the CFDT's proposals and the hypotheses of the Plan

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And what is one going to do with the spent fuels? For right now, not very much is known. At the moment, we have only limited and not very convincing experience with the La Hague plant.

Pierre Desprairies: In 2000, we will perhaps continue to import half of the uranium that we consume. This is a dependence rate on the order of 5 to 10 percent. Even supposing that all the uranium were imported, the foreign-exchange payout would be less heavy than with coal.

L'EXPANSION: Even so, if there is no uranium, there is no electricity!

Pierre Desprairies: True. But as far as one can see, there is no uranium-supply problem for the present lifetime of the power plants.

As for processing of the fuels that come out of the PWR's, it is entirely out of the experimental stage; we are improving our techniques regularly. We are already at a high industrial level: 200 tons have had to be treated.

Michel Rolant: Two hundred tons in 4 years, whereas the announced capacity was 400 tons per year. Do not forget that one would have to manage to treat 800 tons per year for the national program alone.

Pierre Desprairies: Plants are being built for this. The wastes will be vitrified and they will be stored. I do not understand why this problem of the wastes fascinates people's imaginations so. It is an extremely small volume.

Michel Rolant: For right now, the processing separates the various elementary bodies. Some go into the atmosphere and into the sea; some are put into concrete "thingumajigs"; others are put into tanks in which they are agitated and cooled down. One does not know what to do with them. For the time being, that's it. The 200 tons of which you speak are not all put into vitrification.

Pierre Desprairies: One has to know whether one is speaking of the present or the year 2000. For the time being, one is doing the same thing as everyone else: storage.

Michel Rolant: No! Not everyone is storing. Everyone is sending us his wastes. It is up to us to do something with it!


Pierre Desprairies: We try to sort out the rubbish and put it aside and sort out the useful things to make use of them again; as for the foreigners, we send back to them after treatment everything that they sent to us, the wastes and the useful things. I think it is better to burn 100 percent of the uranium rather than 1 percent and to try to economize on the natural resource. It is more intelligent. For pity's sake, let's not commit with uranium the same stupidities of waste as we have done with oil!

If these wastes are transformed into glass, and if they are put into stainless-steel cans sealed in concrete blocks and the whole is lowered into the



# Plan and Counterplan

Total energy consumption (in 5)



Key:

1. What the government wants
2. What the CFDT wants
3. New energy forms

4. Hydro power
5. Coal + gas

6. Nuclear energy
7. Oil

This graph shows the differences between the government's plan and the CFDT as regards nuclear energy in a plan for 1990/

heart of a salt dome at a depth of 1,000 meters--salt which does not budge for millions of years--these wastes in 200 years will be no more dangerous in the mass than the ore that comes out of a mine.

If I were convinced that there is a risk of pollution, I would not agree to continuing along the nuclear road.

Michel Rolant: Let us suppose that you are right. If it is necessary to go that way to have a transitional energy source, under the best conditions of safety for the workers and the populations, let us do nuclear power. It is for this reason that we said: if we cannot do otherwise, let us do EDF's first program contract.<sup>1</sup> With this first contract and the previous power plants, about 135 billion kilowatthours can be achieved. Let us limit ourselves to this program and devote the rest of the financial means that would have been mobilized for nuclear power to a set of other investments in hydro power, gas, coal, renewable energy forms and energy-saving, etc. In this way, by 1990 one has been able to develop a diversified potential for production and saving of energy as well as for rational use of the various energy sources. In particular, money has to be put into the new energy sources. I suppose that if one wants to do a lot of solar heating tomorrow, the techniques have to be improved; and to do so, money has to be devoted to it. The government plan is far too unilateral.

Pierre Desprairies: The PWR is the only nuclear technique presently used on a large scale in the world. It happens that it is American. There are presently 230 power plants in operation in the world, and about half of them function by this technique. We chose it because it was the one that appeared most practical and most highly developed. And also because we wanted to export power plants.

Michel Rolant: This has not been very successful.

Pierre Desprairies: So far, it has been limited. But the last word is still far from being spoken.

Thus there are more than 200 power plants operating in the world, and up to the present--the first was placed in service in the USSR in 1954--they have not killed or injured anyone.

Michel Rolant: There have been fatal accidents in nuclear power plants, France included.

Pierre Desprairies: Some will tell you that coal kills too.

Michel Rolant: People die in the uranium mines also.

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1. The first EDF program contract, called CPl, execution of which began in 1974, comprises 16 PWR units of 900 MWe [megawatts-electric].

EXPANSION: All the same, there are fewer miners in the uranium mines than in the coal mines.

Pierre Desprairies: For 25 years, the PWR has been an energy-production process that does not seem dangerous.

There has been Three-Mile Island. What would one do in France if there were an incident of the Three-Mile Island type? This is a very good question. Three-Mile Island is an essentially psychological phenomenon. There has been no damage from radioactivity around Three-Mile Island, and the risk of injury to the populations, if it ever existed, seems to have been very slim. There was psychological trauma, to be sure, and this is something that has to be taken into account.

I believe that the risks of such an accident's occurring in France are dissipated lower than in the case of the small American company that operated the single Three-Mile Island plant, run by personnel whose technical training was subject to question. The only risk in France, as far as one can see, would be that of a slowdown in production owing to the phenomenon of the cracks—or more precisely, an eventual aggravation of the crack phenomena.

According to what I read and the people whom I consult, the phenomenon is monitored rigorously, and it is not entirely certain that there has been any aggravation. On the worst assumptions, it would be necessary, within 5 or 6 years from now, to have more down time each year and spend more money on overhauling the plants.

Michel Bulant: Someone recently told me that even if it were necessary to shut down one plant in case of danger, the risk would never be taken of shutting down all the others, because the French would not tolerate it, especially if they are heated by electricity. The industrial consequences of the Three-Mile Island accident are considerable, since the reactor is unusable for several years at least.

There is always something unforeseen in a technology over which total control has not been achieved. The aggravation period for the cracks noted in France would be from 5 to 20 years! You see whether I am prudent or not!

I hope that when the time comes, we will know how to make the repairs. For the time being, one does not know. We are told that we will know how to do it within a few weeks or a few months. For the time being, there is not even a reliable verification system.

EXPANSION: May not diversify nuclear power in the direction of the breeder reactor?

Michel Bulant: We are not against continuation of the experimentation with Phenix, but we are opposed to Super-Phenix and to industrial development of the breeders. For several reasons: safety that has not been tested; the

cost, which is very high, the problems of industrial utilization of plutonium. Furthermore, Phenix has had cooling-circuit problems.

Pierre Desprairies: The only incident that I know of with Phenix is a shutdown for 4 months in 1976 or 1977 on the secondary water-cooling circuit because a damaged pump had to be replaced. This was the only shutdown since 1974. Otherwise, it is running like clockwork.

Michel Rolant: But for how many megawatts?

Pierre Desprairies: 250.

Michel Rolant: And do you believe--you who are a technician--that we can go from the 250-megawatt stage of Phenix to the 1,300 of Super-Phenix presently being built at Creys-Malville, especially when we know that the component parts of Super-Phenix have not been tested on full scale, that the big sodium fires have not been got under control, that heaps of questions about safety remain unanswered?

Why are the risks in the nuclear field always to be evaluated only by the technicians?

Pierre Desprairies: Thanks be to God, you have a great many of your technician comrades on the spot in EDF.

Michel Rolant: It is not up to those in charge to decide for the population.

L'EXPANSION: I am not sure that on such technical problems, the citizen is always well-enlightened. Can he be?

Michel Rolant: Not on the details of the technologies, of course. He will probably be like me, he will probably understand nothing about it. But he can express himself as to the degree of risk that he accepts.

Pierre Desprairies: How would you propose to conduct a referendum on a valve that jams, as at Three-Mile Island?

Michel Rolant: If public opinion were well-informed about the possibilities that we have for doing a diversified program, I am sure that it would choose diversification of energy sources rather than the one-only approach--because all one-only approaches involve more risks.

Pierre Desprairies: The PWR was chosen because it is the process most used throughout the world, because it is the one for which there is most experience and also because it is the one with the lowest cost. This is important too!

Michel Rolant: I maintain that the people should be consulted, and not only in the locality where it is intended to establish a power plant, with the bait of the hazard premium at 5 centimes per kilowatt.

L'EXPANSION: Apparently, this is not sufficient.

Michel Salant: This does not prevent it from having been instituted in order to silence some opposition. There is a problem of democracy concerning these energy choices. I am convinced that the people would choose the way of diversification rather than the all-nuclear approach.

Pierre Despreairies: I am not sure. Thanks to many efforts--and those of your comrades--the population is up to date on the problems, the difficulties and the fears that can exist. Furthermore, it is very useful for there to be opposition and discussion.

What makes me support the government decision is that for the 1990 date, there are no possible ways other than the nuclear one.

Michel Salant: You say that the same mistake must not be repeated with nuclear power as with oil. Now they are in the process of making us go all-nuclear, just as all-oil had been done to us, on the pretext--one that is presently unverifiable, in my opinion--that it is far less expensive than all the other solutions. In the name of technocratic rationality.

Pierre Despreairies: Objection, Your Honor! You say that we are going all-nuclear. At present, it must constitute 4 percent of all primary energy, and it will be a maximum of 35 percent in the year 2000. As for oil, it is presently 57 percent, after being as high as 66 percent.

There are two points that you cannot dispute: first of all, nuclear power is the less expensive way that exists. Secondly--and this counts for a lot in my view--it is the better bargain in terms of foreign exchange.

Michel Salant: Heat insulation does not cost any foreign exchange either! The same is true of solar energy, biomass, geothermy, hydro power and French coal!

Pierre Despreairies: Here, I agree.

Michel Salant: But how is one going to finance the rest if one puts hundreds of billions into nuclear energy? That is the problem!

Pierre Despreairies: You say that the nuclear program should be slowed down and the money thus recovered used to promote coal or heat insulation. The government is doubtlessly closer to your position--or vice-versa--than you think. For it certainly has the desire to do the maximum amount of insulation and the maximum it can with biomass. There is only one divergence between the CFEI and the government--personally, I do not yet have a definite opinion on the subject--regarding the maximum that can be done in these alternative ways between now and 1990.

L'EXPANSION: But would this program make it possible to produce the nuclear power equivalent by 1990?

Michel Rolant: Certainly, our proposals have been drawn up with the techniques already tested and the industrial potentials taken into account. They provide for quite a fast startup, yet a realistic one, on condition, of course, that there is the political will, broad support by everyone concerned, development of local and regional initiatives and mobilization of considerable human and financial resources. For example, we have a considerable forest area. Regenerating the French forest will cost a lot, but the important thing is to start it.

Pierre Desprairies: On that point, I acknowledge that you are entirely right. I hope the report that we are in the process of writing will be real, and that it will be convincing; I would like it to contribute to launching development and exploitation of the French forest land. I ardently desire this, for I believe that we have in it a totally national resource that lies asleep.

The second point on which your action, Mr Rolant, is useful is that it obliges us on the Plan committee to review again the possibilities of French coal production, on the supposition that the per-barrel price of oil will go to \$40 to \$50.

What I fear is that physically, what we might do within acceptable economic limits will not give us so many millions of tons of national coal.

Michel Rolant: At present, what is being done is only what is financially possible, in view of the fact that everything is being wagered on the nuclear-energy package. What I fear is that as regards the Plan's priority-action programs, the one concerning energy will be finalized and the credits appropriated to the electronuclear program only.

Pierre Desprairies: That would not be right. I would be thoroughly shocked. That would greatly surprise me.

I hope that we are going in the direction you propose: energy-saving, renewable energy sources, perhaps a bit more national coal. Agreed entirely. As for gas, I would hesitate more, for it is, essentially, imported energy that is going to cost as much as oil, with producers who, I fear, will use their position as the oil producers do. But once all this is tied end to end, I fear that it will not reach far enough.

Michel Rolant: No, no, it does reach far enough! The dossier supplied shows that it reaches, but not with insane electrical-energy consumption like that of the government program. That is the reason why it is said that 100 billion kilowatthours fewer have to be done in 1990.

Pierre Desprairies: If one can have energy in another form, I agree; but I am afraid not.



## GENERAL OFFICER PROMOTIONS, ASSIGNMENTS ANNOUNCED

Paris LE MONDE in French 19 Jul 80 p 7

[List of recent promotions and assignments of general officers in the French armed forces]

[Text] Upon recommendation of Minister of Defense Yvon Bourges, the cabinet approved the following promotions and assignments on Wednesday, 16 July.

## Armament Service

Promotions: To engineer general first class: Engineer generals second-class Victor Marcais, Gerals Nelken, and Bernard Chaslot.

Assignments: Engineer general first-class Pierre Baures as superintendent of the Marine Engineering and Naval Weapons Facility in Paris, and engineer general second-class Paul Sampre as chief, central contracting office, Technical Directorate for Marine Engineering in Paris.

## Army

Promotions: To major general: Brigadier General Francois Bosshardt, Brigadier General Pierre Haicault de la Regontais who is appointed commanding general of the 15th Infantry Division and the 43d Territorial Military Division, Brigadier General Michel Jorant, Brigadier General Alban Barthez who is appointed commanding general of the 27th Alpine Division, and Brigadier General Jean-Pierre Liron who is appointed chief of the French military government of Berlin and commander of the French sector of Berlin; to brigadier general: Colonels Georges Mariage, Jean Quelennec, Xavier Olleris, Pierre Deleume, and Georges Canac who is appointed assistant commander of the 8th Infantry Division and 22d Territorial Division.

Assignments: Brigadier General Michel Lartigue as supreme commander of the armed forces in New Caledonia, engineer general first-class Jacques Valenty as army ordnance inspector, Brigadier General Paul Guillaut as commanding general of the 33d Territorial Military Division, Brigadier

General Pierre Nicolas-Vuillierne as director of army ordnance, and Brigadier General Maurice Schmitt as assistant to the commanding general of the 1st Army, and military governor of Strasbourg.

#### Navy

Promotions: To admiral: Vice Admiral Marie-Henry Chaperon and Vice Admiral Gerard de Castelbajac who is appointed superintendent of the Institute for Advanced National Defense Studies, director of military education, and director of the Center for Advanced Military Studies; to rear admiral: Captain Bernard Caneau.

Assignments: Vice Admiral Pierre Lacoste as commander of the Mediterranean Fleet, and rear admiral Pierre Narbey as assistant to the admiral superintendent of the port of Toulon and deputy for logistics to the admiral commanding the 3d Naval District.

#### Air Force

Assignment: Major General Henri Gimbert as commanding general of the 2d Air Region.

#### Gendarmerie

Promotions: To major general: Brigadier General Jacques Boye who is appointed inspector general of the gendarmerie, and Brigadier General Robert Andraud who is appointed assistant superintendent of the gendarmerie.

Assignments: Brigadier General Louis Bernadac as regional commander of the national gendarmerie in Lyon, and Brigadier General Guy Delfosse as regional commander of the national gendarmerie in Rennes.

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## BEHIND-THE-SCENES MANEUVERS COMPLICATE EC PRESIDENT ELECTION

Brussels KNACK in Dutch 25 Jun 80 pp 171-172

[Article by Rosanne Germonprez: "Thorn, Davignon, and the Legacy of the Fifth Republic"]

[Text] Last week the Benelux countries stated again that Gaston Thorn of Luxemburg will be their candidate for the presidency of the European Commission. It is questionable to what extent the big countries in the EC want to go along with this.

After the European summit in Venice the Belgians really incurred the displeasure of their Luxemburg friends. The German-language paper LETZEBURGER JOURNAL headlined: "Luxemburg Left in the Lurch by Belgium," and LE REPUBLICAIN LORRAIN, which is on good terms with Mrs Thorn, used the following headline: "Belgians To Blame." The correspondent of LE REPUBLICAIN LORRAIN wrote that President Giscard d'Estaing had used Prime Minister Martens the way a fakir manipulates his medium, to thwart the appointment of the Luxemburger Gaston Thorn to the presidency of the EC. Our Luxemburg colleagues were to some extent misinformed but their suspicions were justified.

It had been agreed that the top conference of European government leaders of 12 and 13 June would have produced the successor to the British Labor politician Jenkins whose presidency of the EC ends 1 January 1981. The new president will be allowed 6 months to familiarize himself with the files and to establish contacts with the several governments and EC committees. It was common knowledge that during the dinner the big nations had allowed the Benelux to decide on a new candidate. France had obviously hoped that the little countries would be unable to come up with a decision and display their disagreement by presenting two or more candidates, leaving the final decision to the big countries. The three Benelux countries agreed on the Luxemburg candidate Gaston Thorn, who is now deputy prime minister, minister of foreign affairs, economic affairs, and international commerce, and Luxemburg is one of the founders of the EC and has not yet had a chance to name a president. Giscard d'Estaing does not like Thorn; he secretly informed Prime Minister Martens to nominate EC commissioner for Industry, Etienne Davignon. Officially Belgium did not nominate anybody,

in spite of the Benelux agreement, but it did not state that it favored no candidate. The Luxemburgers would have liked it if we had proposed Thorn's candidacy since a candidate cannot be nominated by his own country.

Anyhow, there was no unanimity behind Thorn, a condition for such decisions. The subject was to be reconsidered by the European Council in the indefinite future. The difficulty is that, in accordance with the rules, it will be Luxemburg's turn to preside and it will be stuck with its own problem. Last week the embarrassment became so bad that it was feared that the big nations would agree on their own candidate during Venice 2 and force their decision on the smaller nations. This left the Benelux countries no other choice but to meet for reconsideration of the matter. This happened last weekend. Their choice became again their common candidate.

David and Goliath

It is, therefore, obvious that Luxemburg is prepared to fight for its cause. Our neighbors to the South believe that they have only two politicians of great stature: Christian Democratic Prime Minister Pierre Werner and Liberal Gaston Thorn. They think that Gaston Thorn is their chance to obtain EC leadership; this chance will probably not repeat itself in the next few years. His fourth time chairmanship of the European Council is an absolute record, he has been a member of the European Parliament for 10 years, he negotiated Britain's entry and also the cooperation agreement with developing nations, Yaounde II, and he is also chairman of the Liberal International Movement. Luxemburg is therefore not even thinking of withdrawing his candidacy.

However, the liberal Thorn will be opposed by the liberal Giscard d'Estaing and not for the first time. The French do not like to enter into discussions about the "profile" of the presidential candidate but they know full well that it is the heart of the debate. Will the EC be led by a politician who will take "European initiatives," who will state his opinion and be more inclined to act independently from the councils, the sum total of the European governments who are now holding all the powers?

Veto Power

Or will the daily EC affairs be in the hands of an official who is a "technocrat" and can be influenced by the councils? This contrast in personalities should not necessarily be extreme, but we want to bring to mind that this argument caused 15 years ago the most severe crisis in the EC and France. The German Christian Democrat committee chairman, Walter Hallstein, thought in 1965 that following the industrial and agrarian integration of the EC, political unification should also be attempted. The EC Committee argued therefore for more independence and more authority for the European executive organs, including itself and the European Parliament. De Gaulle protested by staying away from the EC and returned only after he had been reassured that the EC would never go against

individual member nations, even for the smallest detail. Veto power for every member nation was introduced. It was the end of Walter Hallstein's tenure.

Giscard is afraid that the self-confident Thorn will have a similar personality. Other candidates, mentioned occasionally, are Leo Tindemans or the Dutch socialist Max van der Stoep, they have the same "profile."

Moreover, minor tensions between the Lilliputian Thorn and the French president have already occurred in the past. The French saddled Luxemburg with a nuclear power station in Cattenom, 8 kilometers from its borders and are a continuous threat to one of our neighbor's most prestigious achievements, the Compagnie Luxembourgeoise de Telediffusion, which administers RTL radio and television. The French news agency Havas owns RTL shares and a majority of its own shares are in the hands of the French state. In 1974 it even increased its influence in RTL. Leftists were then making headway in France and the Grand Duchy greatly approved. However, when the Front Commun hit a snag several years ago and the French government continued to tighten its grip on a station which escaped Gaullist control because too many opponents were allowed to use it, Thorn resisted. RTL was a big competitor of French government stations, like Europe 1 or France Inter. The French Government wanted to make its representative deputy manager of RTL, but Thorn, prime minister of Luxemburg, resisted. Giscard succeeded nevertheless in placing his man in that key position. We are apparently only dealing with small-scale differences of opinion but Giscard, for example, took immediate action when Thorn announced his candidacy for the chairmanship of the European Parliament, against Giscard's candidate, Simone Veil. Within the liberal faction he could count on the support of the Belgians, the Dutch, and many Germans, but he had to lose with two votes less than Simone Veil. The conflict was settled in an internal fight of the liberal faction; the fight had not always been fair. The French prince Poniatovsky succeeded in buying some German votes by promising that Herr Bangemann would become chairman of the liberal faction in exchange for their support of the French female candidate. He was successful.

#### Technocrat

It is clear that Giscard does not like Thorn, he would even prefer a Christian Democrat, the PSC member Davignon. For Giscard this can only be a design of secondary importance but in this election year he is trying to get on the good side of the Christian Democrats of Lecanuet; the Pope has already said that he wants to visit him more often, and the rightists of Opus Dei are stepping up their support for his election campaign.

Thatcher, on the other hand, stated last week in the British House of Commons that Thorn is her candidate too, while Helmut Schmidt apparently does not want to go outright against his liberal partners in the government by insisting on a candidate with a different profile. The Benelux is officially supporting Thorn but it is well known that some personalities have



have different sympathies. The Dutch prime minister, Van Agt, is completely taken in by Leo Tindemans, and they do share a number of worries. The Benelux countries, each with a Christian Democratic prime minister, have, so far, respected the rules of precedence and priority. If Thorn should run afoul on a French veto our representatives would certainly avail themselves of the chance to move the presidency to the most eligible Christian Democrat. Dutch Prime Minister Dries van Agt will then have to ignore the advice of the Dutch parliament, which last week pushed the candidacy of Max van der Stoep, ex-foreign minister in the previous cabinet of Joop den Uyl. He already ignored this advice last weekend.

#### Economic Community

If France vetoes the Benelux candidate Thorn, Etienne Davignon of Brussels would have a good chance. Giscard likes the image of the aristocratic, technocratic commissioner of the Economic Community and has never kept that a secret. It is true that Etienne Davignon's political career includes the time he was cabinet chief under Paul-Henri Spaak and Pierre Harmel and he is said to have political ambitions to replace PSC Chairman Paul vanden Boeynants or to become foreign minister, but the French believe that, as helmsman of the EC, he would respect certain limits. Davignon is clever and diplomatic. If he thinks that Europe should act that way, he is not just expressing his own opinion but quoting French Foreign Minister Jobert, who said something similar in 1973. Moreover, Davignon is in the first place a civil servant, a manager, and his political statements will therefore be "forgotten and forgiven." He is to the Quai d'Orsay, which looks upon Brussels and Wallonia as one of its own departments, an outstanding technocrat who looks a lot like Giscard himself. As EC commissioner for industry Davignon proved indeed that he could further develop Europe's economic community. The polytechnicians of the Fifth Republic need that much more than political initiatives.

Emmanuel Tesch, chairman of the European steel magnates and president of Arbed, stated recently that "the pleasing results of the European steel industry are actually not the result of a more dynamic market but in the first place of reorganization and artificial arrangements of the Davignon Plan." Davignon introduced sales quotas for industrial steel products and minimum prices for a list of primary products; he also saw to it that steel was protected at our borders.

Low-interest loans and comprehensive state assistance were to promote restructuring of strong enterprises, which pleased Belgium, Luxemburg, and French financial groups especially. It was less to the liking of the Germans and Dutch who, with their stronger steel conglomerates, defend the system of free competition.

The gigantic steel conglomerate Arbed succeeded, through government subsidies, in penetrating the German market and adding our steel basin of Charleroi to its transnational axis. Viscount Julien Davignon, a cousin



of the EC commissioner, is on the board of directors of Arbed. However, the largest steel enterprises in France are again predicting profits for 1980 and 1981. The biggest steel conglomerate in France is the Wendel Group, a branch of the Suez Holding Company. Next in size is Denain-Nord-Est-longwy (DNEI) with important participation of Paribas. Both Giscard d'Estaing and his foreign minister Jean Francois Poncet are involved in Wendel and Suez. Edmond Giscard d'Estaing, the president's father, and Philippe Giscard d'Estaing, a cousin, are well connected with Paribas.

#### Political Aspect

The third largest group, Empain-Schneider, shares with our Societe Generale a majority interest in Arbed, and Anemone, Giscard's wife, is a Schneider group heiress. Somebody good for the steel industry is good for the French dynasty of the Fifth Republic, whether he realizes it or not.

Politics will certainly be the topic of discussion again in the next few days. Whether Thorn makes it or not will then not only become an indication of the political or technocratic future of the Community but also of the influence smaller nations will occasionally be able to exert with their suggestions or decisions.

10319

CSO: 3105

## NCW PRESIDENT ACCUSES VAN AGT OF NEGLECTING BUSINESS

Amsterdam ELSEVIERS MAGAZINE in Dutch 28 Jun 80 pp 20-23

[Report on interview with Chairman of Christian Employers Union Steef van Eykelenburg, by Alice Oppenheim: "This Cabinet Hasn't Done Enough for Industry -- It May Leave"; passages in slantlines published in italics.]

[Text] The new chairman of the Christian Employers Union, Steef van Eykelenburg, doesn't beat around the bush. He doesn't want to be a member of the CDA [Christian Democratic Appeal] or of any other party, because he doesn't like political games. He also thinks that the Van Agt cabinet should leave because, for example, it isn't close enough to the FNV [Netherlands Trade Union Federation]. Alice Oppenheim in a conversation with a small-time employer.

The so-called fanny-patter taps sprightly back and forth over a somewhat crooked hip when he enters almost abruptly with long, bouncing steps. Once installed, he looks around nervously and obviously is wondering how much time this conversation is going to cost him. But since expenses precede the reaping of profits, and each enterprise requires a certain investment, he actually sits down for it (well, all right then) after a few minutes. He doesn't need to read the story, "There is too little time" he says, and he turns leaves in the agenda. Van Eykelenburg is not self-conscious and that saves him a lot of time and energy.

"Yesterday I heard that things have gone too far in the Netherlands," he says in a low-pitched voice. "Too far, and nothing can be done about it any longer; we're going to the devil. Well, I don't go for that. I'm not going to walk behind that little cart of resignation. For, cannot . . . doesn't exist . . . Want to, and if you want to you push on and you go directly against everything. I have a lot of drive, quite a lot even. I am a coercive fellow. And I don't go for nonsense with all sorts of cock-and-bull stories, but I go straight to the point. Therefore I don't have much affinity with politics. That is: not getting straight to the point; that is: not saying what you think. Some time ago on TV, what was it again? The Iran drama or something like that, with those helicopters. Now, I was interviewed about that and asked what I thought of it. Well, I said, it was a damned difficult decision for Carter and it is a damned

shame that it failed. They also asked Den Uyl who also sat at the table. Now, that one started a story which certainly lasted 5 minutes. I don't know where he got it all. Then it was my turn again. Yes, I said, it is a damned shame; more I couldn't say about it. If it had succeeded, our position here would have been quite different; however, it did not succeed and that's it." He smiles engagingly cheerfully and because of the way the Creator has composed him he resembles a figure from a comic opera. With a little more sideburns he could easily go on the stage.

"When I stand in front of the mirror," he says chuckling, "I have to laugh; also when I am involved in a carnival, then I sometimes think: how can a person change so much that he forgets everything: dancing and singing arm in arm and hands up, peasant smock and crush-hat on and then the evening and the night have passed in no time at all.

"When I still was in construction, I sometimes said at the negotiating table: boys, let's stop this and go to Den Bosch [carnival site], then we'll solve everything as fellow to fellow." He smiles again good-naturedly, but that good-natured smile is a little bit deceitful and not as Burgundian as he appears to be.

The new chairman of the CNW [Dutch Christian Employers Union] is primarily a down-to-earth Dutch businessman, although of Catholic background, but he doesn't mince matters. "In the construction business I would tell wage earners' organizations: 'I don't understand how you can come up with such nonsense. Just take it right back, for you can't win from me with this anyway.' Although they quibbled a little over that, they wondered afterward whether that fool was perhaps right. Thus I found out that one could continue to talk in a business-like manner and be able to achieve a workable compromise." With a shrewd glance aside he says contentedly: "Sometimes that could work as a bluff, but it is no bluff. The other party would soon see through that. No, I am not the most diplomatic negotiator in the Netherlands and I don't want to become so either, therefore I am not too suited for politics." He himself laughs about it too, for you can hardly say about Van Eykelenburg that he doesn't daily get into areas which may or may not have been abandoned by the gentlemen politicians.

As NCW chairman, his first series of negotiations in the Foundation of Labor is already behind him and he didn't find it easy. "I was nervous and tense beforehand and sometimes panicky. In December, when I started to realize that the central accord was going to fail, the moment I started to look over the consequences I lost control; that was pure panic. And I indeed said so to [FNV Chairman] Wim Kok, Harm van der Meulen, my own associates and the ministers. Just think, I said, of what is going to happen if we don't reach agreement here. And they actually were all in panic, except perhaps for Van der Schalie. I remember the glances of Van Agt and Albeda. Harm, who wanted to hear more about it, called out to our side of the table -- it was a panicky situation. Damn, I then shouted, we won't get over what is going to happen now in many years."

Impatiently he taps his fingers right next to the microphone, a sound which later sounds like an army of stampeding horses on the tape. "Well, that's the way it went. Things got out of hand. Then it had already happened."

Van Eykelenburg is a man of quick decisions. A glance at the menu . . . fish. A glance at the winelist . . . white wine. Ten seconds later . . . menus are gone. After his first series of tri-partite experiences he says now already: "Centralized wage debate no longer is of any use. Isn't it obvious it can't go on like that? As far as I'm concerned it doesn't have to, and it won't happen, I think. The only thing we can still do at that level is to keep the deliberations between those federations on central events and to try to give guidance downward about the way to operate, taking into account the public interest. We have always said that deliberation was a great benefit, but we see that it is no longer effective in practice. You see that it is no longer possible to control the whole with respect to both employers and wage earners. Everybody simply wants to go his own way and you should accept and honor that as a given."

The cabinet ought to take steps for the individual to get many more individual responsibilities, so that he will feel much more the consequences of his own actions. And that is true also for the debate situations between employers and wage earners. Everything has to go back to individual branches of industry, or even to the enterprises themselves. There is division even as to details, also in the SER [Social Economic Council]. You could almost say: it is as if one is looking for division. I don't like it at all. There are such divergent opinions within the various federations that the government will get the opportunity to draw its own policy, with all the consequences known by now. I think that Wim Kok has a very great feeling of responsibility, and because of that he thought he had to act the way he did in March. Thus with this I express my feeling of respect for that man, but I do not agree very much with the manner in which he acts. He doesn't perceive the situation too well, he thinks he keeps the FNV together in that way. He assesses it incorrectly. All that shouting, that wasn't like Wim Kok. If he were not so afraid to say things plainly, that would not yield him a loss of members, but a gain. I think it is a pity; he wants too much to be the binding element and he should find out some time that he won't succeed in that. Self-determination in the union movement has increased, people want to do things themselves, decide for themselves. I think that's fortunate. But it has to cause us, as employers, worry, for the alternative of a bona-fide trade union with a strong leader could mean a wild mess. We have to have a proper reaction to that."

Two very neat gentlemen enter the restaurant. They sit down at the next table. Van Eykelenburg's glance becomes more watchful. "That is Van Vulpen, the secretary of the VNO [Federation of Netherlands Enterprises]." The gentlemen greet each other with a friendly little nod and

Van Eykelenburg lowers his voice a little. "I know," he says, scratching behind his ear, "that the employers' world is able to stave off something for a long time. Thus I hear now and then in the country that many employers would be happy if a trade union were to be dissolved. I run into that every now and then. Now, they don't know what they're saying. I always react very angrily to that, for the people who say that are on the wrong road. If they start thinking that Van Eykelenburg might possibly be right, then we have made a little step forward."

He has already forgotten Van Walpen; the word employers is resounding around him. "Employers often promote someone going into the WAO [Law on Labor Disability], then they're rid of him. There are also wage earners who ask their boss: 'can't you help me enter the WAO?' I am of the opinion that the employer must do everything, should be required to do everything, that such a man not end up in the WAO. The politicians all can't believe their ears when I say I am not in favor of decreasing social benefits. The only thing I want is to increase the threshold. For, in a manner of speaking, if I were to decrease benefits from 80 to 70 percent, then I would only be punishing the one who is truly ill or can no longer work."

"I am against the PvdA's [Labor Party] platform that an employer must take 5 percent less-qualified workers into his company. Is there one employer who consciously takes in less-qualified people? Is it thinkable that the people who already work in the company would allow that? Come, come, solidarity doesn't go that far. One must be realistic and then I say: as employers, let's slowly change over to the idea that we no longer turn out the less-qualified, but supply them with adapted work. If someone can manage only half of the work, I can imagine that the WAO supplements the other half financially. The administrative red tape you get because of that will be processed by computer, anyway. My driver was a 100 percent WAO recipient, actually a plasterer by profession. He was no longer able to do that, due to a hernia operation. But on the little piece of paper of the GAK [Joint Administrative Office] and the physician, it says he could no longer work /as plasterer/ but it doesn't say what he is capable of doing. That is the mentality these days and I don't like it."

He talks animatedly and emotionally, expresses himself carelessly and not in a very cultivated manner. A small-time employer, you could say. "I don't care," he exclaims, "as long as they understand me. I don't mind if you say, and you're right for that matter, that there is no work for a lot of people who are now in the WAO, but that doesn't keep me from going through with my line. Thus we'll be forced even more to create, partly through government policy, those conditions under which companies will again operate better."

His hand is held up as if taking an oath. "Yes, I understand that it does sound a little strange, but how is it possible that in one company there is 15 percent sickness absence and in another only 7 percent? /That depends on the atmosphere in such a company/ and that has to be changed. And that



it will create jobs." He has to catch his breath for a moment. Yes, when there are fewer unoccupied places, then that decreases production costs and it improves the competitive position. And that phenomenon in itself, why do I call it something else? That phenomenon in itself can be better for work opportunity. It is our task as federations to say to the entrepreneurs that they care not only for their company, but also for general social developments. I think that one should let an employer feel via his premium obligation that he has many ill people and **WAO** recipients. Now everything is heaped together. And I am not at all in favor of that in the current period. Unfortunately the new platform of the PvdA goes even farther in the other direction. How in heaven's name is that possible? One can see the bitter fruits, can't one?"

He is quiet. Also keeps quiet about the enormous distrust there is toward employers in wage earners' circles. "What laxity," he says and shakes his head. "You hear what I'm saying about it. I am certainly willing to admit that in our circles also a certain love of ease has arisen. /Everything was going well./ And that too much has been expanded under the motto: there is no end to it [benefits]. Employers also have made a wrong use of social provisions. And that is a lack of responsibility. There was not enough critical supervision on everything that happened. One didn't think: will everything remain as it is now? Interest weakened. Every year one said: there is nothing or only very little left for wage increases. Every year it turned out that in the end there was some more room again."

Steef van Eykelenburg is 58 years old but doesn't show any sign of the resignation which often characterizes people at that age. Now and then he laughs deep in his throat about something he himself says. And now and then he stops in the middle of a sentence, only because he really doesn't want to go too far either. He defends the interests of Christian employers and for that he only receives reimbursement of expenses. "Thus I can be thrown out any day and I can also leave any day. That suits me fine." He is part owner of a large construction company in Brabant with 400 employees and, when asked, he says without hesitation that his chairmanship has a favorable influence on the leadership in Vught because he knows more about the general situation and thus can give a broader vision in a meeting of the board of directors. "One is better informed."

The Yoke of the Big Final Responsibility is not yet hanging around his neck as heavy as lead. But yes, he has been there for only a year and his character is able to take some little knocks. When Van Eykelenburg is tense, he tells himself he is tense and that he has to have some relaxation. That usually succeeds after ½ hour of walking through the woods and reading the paper. He uses his prior knowledge of the social course of events in his company primarily "to really care for the well-being of the people who work for you. And to get involved in the question: why does that fellow have difficulties, what's wrong with him?"



"We have a safety inspector who checks if the work is being done safely. For that is still a hopeless matter: to instill the thought in people that they have to watch out for safety." In spite of all the attention, the Van Eykelenburg company also has been involved with illegal worker procurers who wandered through his company like snakes. "Yes, yes," he says, "I exposed that straightforwardly. Of course it is interesting for a worker procurer to escape the social burdens, but I fight against it very hard. Yes, they have been at work in my company too. The investigation is still pending and I am not able to get the data from the controlling agencies."

He rattles off a story about troubles of people in his company, has understanding for them and asks: "Well, then what do I do when the work isn't finished?" And he ends with: "If it happened [the hiring of illegal workers], it was only in one case." Then he takes a big swallow of his last glass of wine, for with all the realism and idealism about being an employer, Van Eykelenburg is first and foremost a businessman.

He was already in business as a small boy in the pleasant city of Amersfoort. His father was a private builder. He designed, built and sold houses for the middle class. On Sundays after church little Steef used to walk around those houses to see if there were prospective clients. "And if one of the interested parties seemed serious to me, I quickly ran home to get my father. I had business in my blood already then. I remember that I had thought up a very inexpensive advertisement for my father. I made a 2½-meter high kite out of white paper and out of black paper I cut the words: /a house of Van Eykelenburg will please you/ [in boldface] . . . And I let that kite fly all Sunday above those houses. That attracted attention, for no one had ever done that. He still chuckles over that now and is still happy with that find. When the priest came to tell the very devout family which always had listened to him very well, that he would very much appreciate it if the family would do business only with Catholics, father and son fell silent. They wouldn't do that, that was going too far. "My father listened to the penitential sermons of Bartholomeus de Greeve, but to conduct business with non-catholics he did not see as a breach of God's laws. I myself found it an absurd situation."

The cabinet. "Yes," says Van Eykelenburg, and taps his fingers again, "the cabinet. /I don't think that this cabinet has done enough for industry/ and if it should fall this summer, I would not be seized by panic. The ministers are weak, they lack the courage to make decisions, they put too much blame on the general economic recession in the world.

"I always say: no matter how strong the influence of others may be on your own actions, you still must do what you can. And they don't do that. When I look at the situation today I say: isn't it better for relations in Dutch society that there should still be a PvdA cabinet? Such a cabinet would be a little closer to the FNV, and there would be consensus a little sooner. [Minister of Social Affairs] Albeda had great difficulties with

the union movement fairly soon. There was no contact, that was a big mistake. There was no contact with us either, for that matter. [VNO Chairman] Mr Van Veen and I had a /real discussion with Van Agt/ only last year. In his I miss the accessibility for the social situation." Without mincing matters he says: /"I am not a member of the CDA, nor of any other political party/. My personal reaction to the Den Uyl cabinet was a 2-year membership in the VVD [People's Party for Freedom and Democracy], but I broke away from that out of disappointment. I don't like political games so much, I prefer to approach matters in a concrete manner.

The Christian Employers Union chairman, with his actor's face, his uncomplicated behavior and his buddy-buddy jokes, still flies a kite now and then. These days technology can do anything, even above the entire Netherlands. /"Employers Must Care More Actively About Work Opportunity."/ [in boldface]. The VUT [expansion unknown] for example, was not set up as a natural discharge regulation for a company in times of economic recession. The VUT phenomenon indeed has not yet been coupled to new jobs. But one doesn't hear wage earners talk about it any longer either. Thus there is a crusade area for both of us. I see the entire so-called APO [Job Opening Agreements] occurrence more broadly now. I would find it an ideal situation if the employer would let someone go into the VUT only if there is room for a younger worker. If that doesn't happen you should perhaps explain a little more clearly in the factory council why you do one thing and don't allow another. Those discussions are taking place now, but sometimes nothing much concrete comes out of them; that also is due to the mentality of both parties. That factory council has existed for 10 years now, but everything goes very laboriously and I am very disappointed about that.

"Yes, I wouldn't mind an ice cream," he says and then looks around somewhat sheepishly. "Tighten my belt? Oh . . . you mean cut back. That is really a rather difficult question. In my circumstances I could perhaps manage with 1000.-- guilders less per month, by which I mean to say that I don't need much for myself. I can't get rid of the driver, because I work and sleep in the car. Yes, if you start living differently, buy fewer miles per year, that would be possible. You could also buy fewer bottles of wine, but perhaps of good quality. My wife, who now has a cleaning woman  $\frac{1}{2}$  day per week, could also manage without one.

"One vacation per year instead of two, all that would be possible, but aren't these things still related to a part of well-being?" He stutters for a moment. "It would mean a decline in prosperity -- yes, that's what it would be. And what do I do with the money I have left over? I lend it out, thus I actually invest it. Thus it stays in circulation. I don't use it all up. Less income . . ." He comes out of it, says with a steady voice and a twinkle in his eye: /"Less income to me means investing less, and thus having less available for the investment of others."/ Afterward he smiles merrily and appears enviably strong and smart.

## CDA PROFITS FROM SCHOLTEN'S POSITION IN STATE COUNCIL

Amsterdam ELSEVIERS MAGAZINE in Dutch 28 Jun 80 pp 44-45

[Article by Rene de Bok]

[Text] Mr Willem Scholten, minister of defense, is leaving for the State Council after having served in the Van Agt Cabinet as an exemplary soldier for over 2 years. The council of wise men appeals more to him than the party political battles in the Second Chamber. To Van Agt, the new role of Scholten has importance as an advance post in a future cabinet formation. That fact has not escaped the opposition either. Bickering all around. That, however, leaves Mr. Willem Scholten cold. Here is the profile of the new "viceroi."

Willem Scholten was born on 1 June 1927 in Deventer, where his father was employed at a printer's office. After his HBS-B graduation he was city reporter for the newspaper Trouw for a short time after the war. From the end of 1945 to 1950 he studied at the Fiscal Academy in Rotterdam; from 1951 he worked at the Ministry of Finance. In 1963 he became Second Chamber member for the CHU [Christian Historical Union]. Besides this, he took a fiscal-legal study direction at the University of Amsterdam where in 1965 he received his doctorate. In 1971 he became state secretary of finance in the Biesheuvel Cabinet. After the fall of this cabinet he returned to the Second Chamber in 1973. Besides financial affairs he also handled defense subjects. In March 1976 Mr Scholten became member of the State Council. The second defense minister of the Van Agt Cabinet has not been in the military service. He is married and is the father of a son and a daughter. Mr Scholten is a practicing member of the Dutch Reformed Church.

When Dr M. Ruppert of the Antirevolutionary Party vacated his vice-chairmanship of the State Council, the rumor machine began to turn full speed in The Hague. The vacancy is not without a certain attraction. The vice-chairman of the college of wise men is the most important advisor to the Queen during a government formation. When a political party succeeds in maneuvering a relatively young candidate like Mr Scholten (53) into this key position, it guarantees itself an important influence for years to come.

In the CDA [Christain Democratic Appeal] point of view, Scholten is an ideal advance guard. Contrary to Dr Ruppert, his reserve towards the socialist majority strategy is well known; however, like Dr Ruppert, his personal integrity is indisputable.

Opposition leader Den Uyl called the appointment of Scholten an "incomprehensible and polarizing act" of the Van Agt Cabinet. Apart from the fact that Den Uyl himself had been rumored as possible successor to Ruppert, and that the official PvdA [Labor Party] candidate, Mr J. van der Hoeven, has been passed over by the Van Agt Cabinet, Den Uyl's vicious growls point to the great importance he attaches to a state council vice chairman from his own circles. Van Agt has outsmarted him at the last minute. Van Agt's declaration that 1) Scholten is far and away the best candidate, and 2) that Scholten has only been lent to the Cabinet by the State Council,--can be brushed aside as obligatory announcements. It had to be Scholten because, in the perspective of the Christain Democratic strategy he is the ideal man.

Defense Minister Willem Scholten has something in common with Mr Fons van der Stee in that he has acted as guardian angel in crucial moments. The difference between them is that Mr Scholten is less pliable than Van der Stee and therefore is even more suitable to follow a planned course as an exemplary soldier. His entrance at the ministerial level happened at a time when the assortment of defense candidates seemed almost exhausted. In the Den Uyl Cabinet, Vredeling was the first to leave and his replacement by Stemerding went rather quietly. Sensational, however, was the departure of the first defense minister of the Van Agt Cabinet, Dr Roelof Kruisinga. For years Kruisinga had urged reinforcement of NATO. At party political meetings in parliament he played man-to-man and to the right of the liberals, hardly hampered by scruples, he blunted the opposition axe. However, once he was comfortably seated in the Catsbyhuis, he was plagued from one day to the next, by a conscience hitherto never displayed. This very Roelof Kruisinga was felled by an inner voice advising against his cooperation in the political defense of the neutron bomb. Van Agt judged: "That is in itself a legitimate point of view, however, he could have announced it a littler earlier."

During the first months of 1978 Dries Van Agt did not seem very fortunate with his collection of statesmen, a few of whom had fallen squarely on their faces in front of the nation for lack of political experience. Van Agt had no need for another failure in defense, especially with an eye on the complications to be expected in connection with the Dutch NATO obligation. Of Mr Willem Scholten it was known that his defense policy views hardly differ from the policy of the government accord CDA/VVD [People's Party for Freedom and Democracy]. During the chamber debate about the 1974 defense budget he once remarked about nuclear weapons: "The role of nuclear weapons, the most horrible implements of war that mankind has ever known--must be pushed back as far as possible. Unfortunately, at this moment we cannot yet do without these weapons. The fear

connected to strategic nuclear weapons is a guarantee against surprise attack. Therefore NATO cannot afford not to keep conventional battle forces of equal strength as the Warsaw Pact." Van Agt did not need any more information. But it was difficult to detach Mr Willem Scholten from his function at the State Council. The highest advisory college is considered the end station for politicians and Scholten shared that view. It was Aantjes who changed his mind. Scholten reported his inner emotions to Alice Oppenheim in November of 1978: "When I became member of the State Council in 1976 I really should have taken leave of politics. I could see no reason to return again. The decision to accept the defense post was made one weekend when, after listening to a number of people, I realized that personal motives should not be allowed to dominate. And besides, it would not be in the interest of this country if problems should appear after 2 1/2 months of governing. For me personally it was a very difficult decision. We made it together, my wife and I. I could not have done it alone because I know that I cannot manage the job of minister alone."

Mr. Willem Scholten in the role of guardian angel of the Van Agt Cabinet. Prime Minister Van Agt may consider himself fortunate in his choice because it is primarily due to the level-headedness and political knowledge of his defense minister that his cabinet emerged unscathed from the nuclear arms debate of December of last year. Also Scholten's performance at the NATO Head Council in Brussels, of which the outcome was of imminent importance in the loaded atmosphere in the Second Chamber, was balanced and business-like. His defense in the Second Chamber did much good after the chaotic picture painted by Van der Klaauw, minister of foreign affairs.

On 1 October, Mr Scholten again leaves from the State Council. It can no longer be assumed that this will end his political career. As key figure in future cabinet formations another appeal will be made on his political ingenuity. As exemplary soldier of the Van Agt Cabinet, a rift between the new vice-chairman of the State Council and his Christian democratic background seems unthinkable. Van Agt can be pleased.

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CSO: 3105



## PAPER VIEWS IMPORTANCE OF NATO CONTINGENCY STOCKPILING

LD301603 Oslo ARBDEIJERBLADET in Norwegian 24 Jul 80 p 4

[Editorial: "In Norway's Interests"]

[Text] The defense of Norway is primarily a Norwegian concern. The whole of our defense policy is based on the principle that a possible aggressor will be met by maximum Norwegian strength. Through our membership of NATO we also have an inbuilt assurance and guarantee that in such a situation the main Norwegian forces would receive allied reinforcement. This has formed an important part of our defense planning ever since 1949.

It goes without saying that it is in Norway's vital interests that these reinforcements could arrive as quickly as possible, should the need ever arise. This would not only concern the transportation of military forces but also of military equipment. This latter needs a transport capacity which would often be difficult to improvise at short notice. For this reason allied air force and navy units, for example, have long had military stockpiles located in Norway. These stockpiles can include important spare parts, ammunition and fuel. But as far as land forces are concerned, there has up to now been little contingency stockpiling. Nor have our allies in NATO been willing to earmark combat troops for deployment in Norway should the occasion arise.

From the Norwegian viewpoint it is desirable both to have allied forces earmarked which can be part of maneuver arrangements in Norway and contingency stockpiling of heavier military equipment for these forces. This is a view that the starting has supported time and time again.

In other words, contingency stockpiling is not a new political question in Norway. What is new is that it now seems as if the United States is interested in contributing to contingency stockpiling. When in the past this has been difficult to achieve, both in contacts with the United States, Britain and to a large extent Canada, the reason given was that each nation of course wants to stand as free as possible to deploy its military forces and its materials in a crisis situation.

These views now seem to have changed a little, on both earmarking and contingency stockpiling in Norway. This is obviously connected with the improvement in quality that has taken place in the Soviet Union's air force and naval defense forces in the northern areas. Technological developments mean that the Soviet Union is now in a position to cut off allied reinforcements to Norway more quickly and over a greater area than in the past. It goes without saying that this weakens the defense of Norway in a way that is not in our national interest.

Technological developments have made the time factor even more important in a situation in which Norway may be under attack. It is well known that under present circumstances it would take weeks for allied reinforcements with all the necessary equipment to reach a possible future Norwegian theater of war. With contingency stockpiling of heavier military equipment the time needed to get reinforcements here could be significantly reduced. This is an important reason why Norwegian authorities have been interested in contingency stockpiling.

Another factor, to which we would attach even greater weight, relates to the point in time at which it becomes necessary to call for reinforcements. It is not difficult to see that if a situation in the northern areas does not in itself amount to a threat of war, then the crisis could be triggered off merely through Norway's calling in reinforcements. In other words contingency stockpiling will give us more time to evaluate and deal with so-called "false crises."

As mentioned above the Storting has already given its approval in principle to contingency stockpiling. The matter has not gone any further at the present time. A committee, with defense ministry undersecretary Bjoern Bruland as chairman, has been appointed to work out the details. When the committee's recommendations are ready some time in the new year, it will give a concrete answer to how Norway wants contingency stockpiling to be put into practice. It is this that will be our point of departure in negotiations with the United States in the matter. Important conditions for contingency stockpiling will in any case be that nuclear arms or ammunition will not be stored on Norwegian soil, that foreign troops will not be stationed here and that the contingency stockpiles will be under total Norwegian control. It is therefore pointless to use this question as a basis for claims that Norway is in the process of changing its policy on nuclear arms or military bases.

CSG: 3108

## STOCKHOLM PAPER REPORTS BACKGROUND OF IMPENDING SPY TRIAL

LD051459 Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 1 Aug 80 p 3

[Report by Bo G. Andersson: "Norway--Well-Known Peace Researcher in Spy Trial"]

[Text] Is it treason to use the telephone directory and public documents to gather information on the nuclear arms balance between East and West?

This is the main question in a new Norwegian spy trial which will begin in Oslo next week.

The well-known Norwegian peace researcher Nils-Petter Gleditsch of the Norwegian Peace Research Institute risks prosecution for having disclosed in a report 11 Norwegian listening stations. The coauthor of the report is Owen Wilkes, a New Zealander, who works at SIPRI (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute).

The report was published in February last year. The two researchers had been working on it for 3 years, partly with the help of a grant from the Norwegian state.

In the report the researchers point to where the listening stations are situated and discuss what significance they could have for the disarmament negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union. Several of the stations are situated very close to the Swedish border.

The majority of the listening stations are not in military areas, but are surrounded by simple fences and warning signs of the "private area" and "entrance forbidden" type.

But behind the discrete facades one of the world's most advanced listening systems is hidden, the report says.

The two peace researchers claim that this system is of great importance for NATO to be able to maintain surveillance of Soviet nuclear-armed submarines' exercises and positions in the Arctic region, for example.

this area.

This report shook many Norwegian politicians and military leaders and gave rise to headlines in the Norwegian press. The reason is that the storting once decided that Norway would not take part in NATO's nuclear arms program.

The Norwegian military was of the opinion that the report was "detrimental to defenses and the nation's security." Norwegian police immediately began an investigation, which was completed earlier this week. The matter is now in the hands of the Norwegian state prosecutor who will decide shortly whether Nils-Petter Gleditsch is to be prosecuted.

If prosecution does take place it will be for breaches of the criminal code's espionage paragraphs and of the law on defense secrets.

Unlike Gleditsch Wilkes is not suspected of espionage against the Norwegian state. However, he has been called to Oslo for police questioning on several occasions.

The researchers have always claimed that they only used public documents.

"In the telephone directory we found information about the listening stations. They are to be found under the heading 'Defense radio establishment at...'. We also used public material from the Norwegian Civil Servants' Association," Owen Wilkes told DAGENS NYHETER.

"We also traveled round to the various listening stations, noted what sort of antennae they had and in which direction they were aimed, and so forth. We also took pictures of the establishments."

"But the important thing is that we never broke any rules, in that the stations, unlike ordinary military areas, are not closed areas. Any foreign citizen at all could have behaved as we did."

Wilkes thinks that prestige plays a large part in the affair.

"The Norwegian military reacted with panic when the report was published. No one bothered to find out how we had come by our information. The affair has now gone so far that the authorities cannot admit that they are wrong in charging us with spying."

A sign that the Norwegian authorities are now acting with a degree of caution is that only Gleditsch risks prosecution, Wilkes thinks.

"Our report is important for the debate on security policy in the whole of Scandinavia," Wilkes said.

"It showed that the West knows much more about Soviet nuclear arms plans than was stated at the disarmament discussion.

"For this reason this type of information can be of significance for the SALT negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union for example," Owen Wilkes said.

CSO: 3109

## BRIEFS

TRADE WITH USSR--Exports from Norway to the Soviet Union were 56 percent higher in the first 5 months of this year than in the corresponding period last year. In the first instance commodities such as chemicals, paper, cardboard and other products show a marked increase. According to reports that AFTENPOSTEN has received, this increase in exports has, however, little to do with the American boycott of the Soviet Union after the intervention in Afghanistan. In the majority of cases of business with state trading countries, contracts are signed a long time before the actual deliveries take place. The value of Norwegian exports in the first 5 months totaled 236 million kroner, while exports for the corresponding period last year amounted to 151 million kroner. Chemicals rose from 51 million kroner in the first 5 months of last year to 75.1 million in the first 5 months of this year, while paper, cardboard and other products rose from 67 million kroner to 95 million for the same period. Imports of Soviet goods in the first 5 months of this year were 34 percent lower than for the corresponding period last year. Imports in the first 5 months of last year were 237 million kroner, while they fell this year to 176 million kroner. [Text] [LD061159 Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 31 Jul 80 p 11]

CSO: 3108



## SANTIAGO CARRILLO REPORTS TO CENTRAL COMMITTEE

Madrid MUNDO OBRERO SEMANAL in Spanish 19-26 J . 80 pp 16-21

["Text" of speech by Santiago Carrillo, secretary general of the PCE, to the PCE Central Committee at its 15-16 June 1980 meeting in Madrid]

[Text] The Central Committee of the PCE met in Madrid on 15 and 16 June. The following issues were examined in that meeting: the political situation, some international topics -- especially the irresponsible initiative by the UCD [Democratic Center Union] government, through statements by Oreja [minister of foreign affairs] proposing Spain's joining NATO by 1981 -- the PCE labor union policy under conditions of a long, deep-seated crisis and increasing unemployment. In addition, our country's agrarian situation and the party's policy on that topic were discussed. A resolution on some problems of education concerning the next school year was approved. We wish to emphasize, from Santiago Carrillo's speech, whose full text we are publishing, the three proposals to the PSOE [Spanish Socialist Workers Party], in order to compare the positions of both parties on how to carry out political activity with a new majority by means of a new government. The courses for taking the autonomy processes out of their present stagnation because of the attitude of the Suarez government. The possibilities for international action to facilitate dialog between the parties in the workers' movement in Europe in behalf of peace and the success of the Conference on European Security and Cooperation, by obstructing the government's plans for Spain's joining NATO.

In the next issue of our weekly, we shall publish the other resolutions adopted by the Central Committee.

I do not intend to make what is understood as a policy report in which a multitude of issues would have to be treated, but, rather, merely to speak to open this debate by making a few statements on the present political situation. I deliberately leave to one side many topics that have been present in recent weeks, to focus on what seem to me to be the essential features of the situation. Moreover, this time more than ever, radio and television have provided abundant political material to feed the debate in which we are going to engage here.

Naturally, I shall also discuss, at the end of my speech, especially, a topic that came up in the press today: the desire, announced by Marcelino Oreja, for the government to raise the issue of NATO, admission to NATO, in 1981. The seriousness of this issue that has been raised is not hidden from anyone of those present here.

The political debate in Parliament has shown three things clearly: on the one hand, the inability of the Suarez government to cope with the essential problems of this period. Then, its minority position in the Chamber and in the country, which became pronounced in last Thursday's voting, and, finally, the need for another government, another policy.

Basically, it is a question of three affirmations that our party has been putting forth, in one way or another, since the June 1977 elections, at various times. The whole process of change has suffered from this government situation and the need for finding a solution to it is much more urgent now. It was a mistake, not shared in by the communist group in Parliament, to introduce the censure motion, called constructive, into the Constitution. At the beginning of May 1978, when it was discussed in the constitutional committee, we already stated that, after the negative experience that we were having with a minority government, it seemed incredible that the desire to prolong that method should continue. We stated that, in a democratic, parliamentary regime, majority governments are needed for governing normally with authority, otherwise the danger of impotency is incurred.

We were not listened to and we saw the consequences when, at the conclusion of the debate on the censure motion, there was a majority against the government, but it was not possible to open up a crisis and Suarez and his team, on which there are so many political incompetents, remained standing through fire and water. In spite of the apparently humble and self-critical tone with which Suarez promised to open up a period of reflection, actually no desire to keep that promise is in evidence.

The UCD congress in Andalucia was a touchstone. The slightest desire to reflect would have led to opening up the way there to the autonomy process by means of 151, as the overwhelming majority of the people of Andalucia are demanding. Nevertheless, what UCD restated was the desire to close off that path, absolutely, and to apply the criterion of the autonomies already granted, exactly like before the censure motion.

The same desire was repeated in the debate on reform of the referendum law that the government won with a majority of only one vote, owing to the commendable attitude of the Basque Nationalist Party, which always had our solidarity, when the Constitution was being discussed and then in the discussion of the Basque Statutes, and now it has given evidence of a complete lack of solidarity -- definitely characteristic of bourgeois nationalism -- with the other peoples of Spain who also want their autonomy.

#### Suarez and the Traditional Centers of Power

What is there behind the obstinacy of Suarez? Merely his personal stubbornness and that of his whole team? Although it is obvious that Suarez has lost the ability and boldness that seemed to move him at the beginning of the change, that is not the basic issue. Actually, Suarez and his government are acting in accordance with an extraparlimentary power center composed of the remnants of the mechanism of Franco's state, in the economic mechanism and in various ideological mechanisms representing a restraint on the whole democratic process. What is being attempted, just as in other aspects of the transition, is to make the least possible decentralization and to do this in such a way that this traditional power center will keep its positions in the state intact. Therefore, the establishment of a real democratic state of autonomies that will assume satisfactorily the actual diversity of the peoples making up Spain and that will prevent, not the territorial breakup but rather the country's political breakup in the emergence of self-excluding cantonal positions, which is the real danger of the policy being carried out by the government and, in general, by the right. These cantonalisms would make it still more difficult to give shape to the conditions needed for governing Spain. The creation of that state of autonomies, I emphasize, requires absolutely a change of government, a change of policy. Other no less serious and urgent reasons are added to these reasons. In the first place, the economic crisis, on whose nature and long duration we have already spoken at other times.

#### Guaranteeing Our Exports to the EEC

The government's economic program has already shown its inanity with regard to the crisis. Every forecast indicates that stagnation and inflation are going to continue to increase in the immediate future. At this time, we are seeing a resurgence of protectionist trends in the developed countries, the criticism to which the processes of economic integration are being subjected in Europe, the statement by Giscard d'Estaing who threatens to stop Spain's admission to the Common Market -- a restraint apparently confirmed in the Venice meeting, in spite of the optimistic statements by Calvo Sotelo -- are not a mere election maneuver, but rather a reflection of those protectionist trends. Under these conditions, we communists believe that a policy with much greater transparency is indispensable in Community negotiations. A responsible participation by all the national sectors affected, as we already demanded in the congress. Although our entry into political Europe should take place as soon as

possible, economic integration strictly speaking has to be accomplished with all the precautions and time needed so that it will not result in a greater worsening of the situation of our economy. It is not a question of falling purely and simply into protectionism, but, without doubt, we have to guarantee at all costs defense of the nation's interests in those negotiations. We must also demand that the security of our agricultural exports be guaranteed, something that recent events in France show is not happening. And, at the same time, that concern puts us in full solidarity with the demand of the entire Spanish countryside, protesting against agreements of the Spanish Government and the Moroccan Government that are not public, by means of which Moroccan agricultural products are going to go to Europe by passing through Spain, while our fishing craft are seized day after day by the Moroccan military fleet.

#### They Neither Invest Nor Allow Investments

Meanwhile, the nation's economic picture is truly disturbing. Private investment is still at its lowest point and, on the other hand, is escaping from us to go abroad. All the measures in the government program were aimed theoretically at promoting investment, putting pressure on wages, facilitating dismissals, increase of the disproportion between agricultural and industrial prices, tax cutting and exemptions, and so on. But, in practice, the result is an increase in unemployment and the reduction of wage income is leading to a greater falloff of demand.

At the same time, the crisis is also reducing the possibilities of exporting to foreign markets. Under these conditions, who is going to invest and why invest? That indeed is a vicious circle, a vicious circle that may break up public investment fundamentally. But the government is not moving in that direction. And it is not moving in that direction because a big businessman who does not invest does not want his deficiency to be replaced by public initiative, fearful that it will lead, through the crisis, to a process in which public enterprise will end up by playing a more determining part and a different one from the one it plays at present in Spain's economy. This crisis is being tackled -- and at times not only by the government, but also by opposition groups -- with traditional capitalist criteria that are unsuitable. This is not a usual cyclical crisis. Everyone has agreed to that. Nevertheless, usual criteria are being applied.

The traditional idea that by increasing productivity, by reducing personnel, by compressing wages, by cutting taxes, the rate of profit of the businessman is increased who, in turn, invests, develops his business, creates new jobs and adjusts the cycle with trend of the market, does not work now. Therefore, the Workers Statutes, which open the gates to unemployment, and the Marín Agreement, both of which are conceived under the influence of that same traditional idea, not only are not yielding positive results for the economy, but rather are accentuating stagnation, unemployment and a falloff of demand. The proof of this lies in the increase in unemployment in these first months of 1980 in which we have gone from 1,000 unemployed a day last year to 1,500, in spite of the optimistic statements made yesterday on television by the minister of labor, Sanchez Teran.

On the course that is being followed, it is conceded that there may be 3 million unemployed persons in Spain in 1983. Under these conditions, capitalist logic leads inevitably to noninvestments. There is no magic spell to inspire confidence in possible investors other than the certainty of profit. And we must not set too high a value on foreign investments, which seek, in Spain, a bridgehead toward the Common Market and which introduce machinery and equipment here from which they have previously extracted a surplus value, running very slight economic risks.

#### Public Initiative and Planning as Solutions

We communists have said that only public initiative, on the basis of planning objectives and utilization of public and private funds and also funds from foreign loans, can create jobs and achieve a certain degree of revival of the economy that will increase demand and will promote private investment as much as possible, making it possible, at the same time, to reconvert industries in crisis. And only a complete utilization of the nation's energy resources and the establishment of privileged political relations with the nonaligned countries -- this rules out any commitment with NATO -- can help us to palliate the consequences of the energy crisis.

But if reduction of the rate of inflation is established as a priority, single objective, almost a taboo, setting it in opposition to the need for reviving the economy and for creating employment, we are headed toward a situation in which an intensification of tension will upset the whole democratic process. Therefore, the change of government and of policy that Spain needs is very deep-seated. And the urgency of carrying it out is pressing. If not, at a time when the economically strongest countries are going to try to save themselves to the detriment of the rest, Spain, may become a practically underdeveloped country, after being a country with average development approaching the level of the industrialized countries.

Through the initiative of the Executive Committee, a committee is already functioning to study these economic problems and is preparing concrete alternatives. We believe that the Central Committee should recommend that this committee accelerate its work and give us suitable material, not only to mobilize the forces of labor for the attainment of vital objectives, but also to interest the forces of culture to promote a broad debate that will go beyond the limits of the party, among all those interested in the topic on the nature of this crisis and the solutions dictated by the objective requirements of progress in Spain, for the purpose of creating an authentic national awareness around them.

Our vote in favor of the PSOE's motion of censure is in line with this concern, which is obviously not exclusive, because the topic of protection of civil liberties, seriously attacked today, of human rights, and also of eradication of terrorism and of a guarantee of the citizens' security, the issue of democratic reform of the state, are present in our proposals with all the importance that they deserve. We believe that the



solution that we are advocating and, at the same time, are preparing more and more concretely on the problems of the crisis has to have its firmest support in the understanding by the left -- especially socialists and communists -- that we should move forward in a study of these issues in a more coordinated manner. And we also believe that, in contrast with the government's economic program, which calls for development of a nonexistent liberal economy, a real illusion, it is necessary to take, in that solution, a definite option in favor of the decisive role of public enterprise and of the state's initiative, in order to come out of the crisis.

#### Alternative of National Solidarity

Does that mean that the alternative that we are advocating is exclusively a leftist alternative? We think that it is not, that it might be defined as an alternative that is national in nature, an alternative of national solidarity determined by our concrete situation in the world economic context, by the real level of our economic development, by the requirements of the interest of Spain, as that kind of country, and of the various peoples who make it up, therefore we regard it as an alternative of social progress, but not only social, but also economic, material and cultural.

The reality is that in capitalist countries much more developed than ours, the state already plays a considerably larger role than here in regulating and managing the economy, and that is because there private enterprise has much more solid possibilities and structures than in Spain and the laws of the market operate more effectively than here.

What we regard as the key idea is that, if we want to cope with this crisis in Spain, the state -- including in this word not only the central administration but also the autonomous and municipal agencies -- has to play a much greater leading part in economic activity. It is not a question of state ownership at all costs or of reducing private initiative. It is not a question of putting an end to the laws of the market. Independently of the conceptions that some of us may have on the model of society, it is a question of real facts and those facts are that here there are no capitalist groups sufficiently strong and organized to cope with the crisis in accordance with the criteria of classic liberalism. The state is called upon to take the initiative in economic revival, to plan seriously, to accumulate and distribute resources effectively. This concerns not only the workers. It is also of vital concern to private businessmen who are going to be able to get out of inactivity and stagnation, if a revival is achieved, a policy of distribution of resources, not improvised from day to day, a clear view of the objectives and expectations with which they are working. And we take it for granted that, in order to fulfill this function satisfactorily, it is necessary to put public enterprise on a sound footing and to democratize it and to carry out the imperative reform of the state's administration.

From this point of view, the issue of productivity, of a struggle against absenteeism, of the quality of labor, would no longer be tied to the

prospects of more unemployment, more stagnation, more exploitation, but rather to an effort at social solidarity, in order to make the country progress, to redistribute income more fairly, to move toward overcoming unemployment and social underprivileges; in one word, to improve the standard of living. To the extent to which it may be necessary to make sacrifices -- and we would not avoid making them -- they would have a sense of solidarity, of equality, and not of an intensification of differences and criteria.

It is true that in order to achieve this solution, the forces of labor and of culture have to attain a role that they do not have at present in directing society. The heads of CEE [Spanish Confederation of Business Organizations] and, in general, that center of oligarchic power to which I referred at the beginning must cease influencing policy exclusively, in the interest of society as a whole. Our whole policy of democratic concentration pursued that objective precisely. It is true that it has clashed, as was logical, with the obstinate opposition of the political-social right, but also with a lack of understanding by our PSOE comrades, who were thinking of bipartisanship and of the fact that the solution rested exclusively in its government alternative. The way in which they introduced the motion of censure in Parliament is not yet entirely free from this conception. But the important thing is that this initiative may give rise to new dynamics that will overcome the former narrow positions.

#### Socialists and Communists in Agreement

An important component of that new dynamics is that after the municipal agreements the country saw socialists and communists agree once more, now on something more important, on the need for raising the whole question of Spanish politics and that has created a real hope for change. It has strengthened unification trends. It has become evident that a majority different from the present one is impossible without communist participation. The attempts made by the government to deny legitimacy to that participation have been overcome by the debate and its repercussion on public opinion. But, in addition, and in a general way, introduction of the motion has placed on the table an issue that might be obviated, if we proceed only in the field of propaganda: the issue of coalitions for governing, an issue that goes beyond socialist-communist cooperation.

There is no doubt that there are other forces of progress in the country in addition to the PSOE and the PCE. It is true that those forces are subjected to pressure by the national and international right. They hesitate, are doubtful and it is difficult for them to decide on a definite option of progress that would entail breaking preestablished equilibriums. But three factors may lead them to decide to collaborate in a policy of progress. First, the evident failure of the right, which not only has not been resolved, but rather has made the political-social problems still more complicated. Second, the acuteness of these problems, which do not allow much delay in tackling them rationally, if there is a desire to prevent the deterioration from reaching its extreme limits. Third, the force of attraction that may be exerted by an understanding by socialists

and communists on other political-social forces. Of course, the risk that this new dynamics will die out and not lead to concrete results also exists. There is going to be no lack of national and international pressure to stop it or to divert it and it will be strong, and when we comment on Oreja's statements we shall see that this is so. Everything is going to depend on the continuity that the action started with the censure motion will have.

It might also happen that UCD, in its own interest, will be capable of removing the Suárez-Abril Martorell team from heading the government and that another government team will emerge from within it. Thus, UCD would be the change of UCD, but this kind of solution, theoretically possible, would not prove to be the most effective solution to the present problems.

#### Parliamentary Action Is Not Enough

The effective solution lies in another type of government, in another type of policy. We believe that action in Parliament is not sufficient to achieve it. It has to be supported and put in concrete form by broad action at the people's level and at other political levels, in order to work out an alternative to the present UCD government that will be plausible and acceptable in broad sectors and not merely testimonial and propagandistic. A motion of censure against the government cannot stop at the solutions that were offered by the motion discussed in Parliament at the end of May.

Another motion cannot be repeated unless the groundwork has been laid previously for its success. That would involve, among other things, a broad agreement on the program, composition of the government and a candidate for prime minister who can obtain a majority in the present Parliament.

An important matter to be elucidated is the issue of relations between socialists and communists. Each party has its history, its marks of identity, its characteristics. There have been periods of conflicting relations between both and periods of unification, and although PSOE has operated within the Second International, it is true that in the best periods of its history it has always been to the left of it. As soon the democratic change began, the national and international right brought strong pressure to bear to separate PSOE from any policy of cooperation with the communists and to push them into positions of the social-democratic type. That pressure still exists and it was very evident in certain UCD speeches in the political debate in Parliament. As far as we are concerned, we are moved by a determined desire for an understanding with PSOE. This desire does not rule out criticism of comrades on aspects on which we are not in agreement.

We emphasize this unity point of view with realism, in view of what the situation of both parties is at present and the objective difficulties that there are. We do not deny an obvious fact. At present, PSOE is a party with a much larger parliamentary representation than ours and this gave it, logically, a leading political part to which the PCE could not

aspire in the past debate. We have to succeed in having a stronger representation, so that our proposals may have greater weight in parliamentary activity. Neither do we deny another reality, that we are two competing parties, because we draw our forces from the working classes and from the progressive culture sectors. The first of these two realities might induce PSOE leaders to think that they have no need for us. The second one might lead them to believe that we should be isolated, in order for them to occupy more favorable positions in the competition. With all cordiality, we must warn our socialist comrades that similar attitudes have led other European socialist parties to fall into a policy of class collaboration that has weakened them and put them in a more unfavorable situation in the competition. Instead of winning with those attitudes, they have lost. This is no piece of advice that we would avoid very much giving to an adult party like the PSOE. It is a very deep concern for the role of the left in a Europe in crisis, for the dangers that discussion and intensification of competition between worker parties, regardless of what party causes it, have for the forces of labor and of culture and for peace.

#### PSOE-PCE, Convergent Paths

We wish to point out that throughout history we communists have supported, in this country, more than one government headed by PSOE, and we are ready to do this again, when conditions are right for it. In the case of the motion of censure, we must confess that some extremes of the program outline submitted by comrade Felipe Gonzalez did not fully satisfy us and that we did not see, in this Chamber, any real possibilities for a government with a socialist prime minister. Nevertheless, we gave our support to give evidence of the desire for unity that inspires us and in the thought that it was a question only of the first phase in action to change the government and the majority in which the time periods made some improvisation necessary and that the subsequent development of that action would make it possible to achieve more suitable results.

I have spoken of the greater leading part played by PSOE in the past parliamentary debate as a natural event in the present correlation of groups in the Chamber. Without being able, at present, to draw a parallel between the electoral strength of PSOE and of PCE, we must say that the difference does not give rise to any inferiority complex in us communists as a party. We are well aware of the firmness of our real strength. It lies in the firm rooting in the most combative and dynamic sector of the working class, in the support by very valuable groups of intellectuals, in our adherence to the theory of revolutionary Marxism from a critical and creative point of view and in the position of a clear, definite plan for society above the contingencies of any given political state of affairs. That gives us a remarkable capability of adjustment to difficulties of the moment and a capability of operating with a historical point of view and with security in the future. On the basis of that, we believe that competition with the PSOE should take place on the grounds of comradeship peculiar to two kindred parties whose rank-and-file are brothers and whose objectives are very close. The immense majority of the voters in this



country are manual workers or intellectuals. We believe that the common task of both parties is to continue to liberate those voters from bourgeois political influences, to continue to win them over to socialism, and that, therefore, the PCE's electoral growth, in which we have confidence, does not have to be achieved substantially to the detriment of the growth attained by the PSOE. Moreover, it is logical that the political-social right may stir up the threat that rapprochement to the PCE is going to deprive the PSOE of the moderate votes that it may have at present. The right is interested in isolating the PCE, in weakening and denaturalizing the PSOE, in breaking up the forces of socialism and, consequently, in preventing the formation of what should be the nucleus of an alliance for progress in our country and it is still more interested in this situation of crisis, whose probable characteristics and duration may be a favorable field for bringing up a change in the model of society. But we are convinced by historical experience, here and beyond our borders, that a PSOE-PCE rapprochement will not take votes away from either party, but rather will increase their number. On our part, in spite of the differences that we have had recently with the PSOE concerning economic and social policy and that have given rise, on certain levels, to serious confrontations, we have striven and are going to strive to transmit to our members and sympathizers a message of unity that will avoid the consequence of momentary disagreements justifiable in crystallized sectarian positions. We do not want to see an adversary in the PSOE, but rather a party with which we shall finally have an increasingly better understanding. We believe that we are not traveling along two parallel lines that are never going to meet, but rather along two convergent lines that will end by joining during the historic process. We are sure that this is the feeling of many socialists and, of course, of the great majority of aware workers, regardless of whether or not they are members of PSOE and PCE.

Not only because of this point of view, but also especially because of the task of bringing about a change of government and of policy that has come up today, we cannot understand how, since not before proposing the motion of censure, after the debate in Parliament, we have not yet received a reply to our proposal to make a joint examination of the situation and its possible developments.

We would say cordially that our PSOE comrades should be careful not to repeat from the opposition the formal behaviors that UCD has in the government.

If what is involved, as we believe and as the country hopes, is to continue laying the groundwork for a new majority of progress, the PSOE cannot wait for that to take place by means of mere contacts in the corridors of Congress. What has to be carried out is a whole combined political action, on various levels and in the broadest circles. Otherwise, the censure motion would not lead to anything concrete and we would defraud the millions of Spaniards who have seen a new hope rise up after the televised debates.



## Points of Agreement on International Policy

There is another very important field in which we Spanish socialists and communists might have a common activity today: the field of struggle for peace in the world. Perhaps there is no other country in Europe in which socialists and communists have stands on international policy that are so close to each other. Both of our parties are against joining NATO or any military bloc and we are in favor of eliminating the bloc policy. We are opposed to military intervention by some countries in the affairs of other countries and, consequently, we are against the occupation of Afghanistan. We are in favor of joining the Common Market and the establishment of privileged relations with the Third World. We are for a new world economic order; for negotiations to free Europe, on both sides, from nuclear weapons; for a policy of peace in the Mediterranean; for support of the POLISARIO [Popular (Front) for the Liberation of Saguia el Hamra and Rio de Oro] Front, of the PLO, and so on. Both of our parties are convinced that a policy inspired by those principles can provide Spain with an important international position more favorable to its interests. Why, then, can we, the PCE, be in agreement with Francois Mitterrand and with the British Laborites on those issues and, on the other hand, why are we Spanish socialists and communists not capable -- and we are not to blame -- of taking the initiative in that dialog for which both of our parties are better situated than other European parties? Sometimes, in view of these contradictions, our comrades feel that in the leadership spheres of PSOE there is not the determination that there was, for example, in the leadership of the French Socialist Party to refuse to accept the American veto of full participation by the European communist parties in the democratic political activity of their countries. That is to say, to reject what, in practice, is a policy of limited sovereignty in Europe imposed by the Americans.

But what is certain, is that we are acting jointly in the municipalities and that we could so act still better than we are acting, have been acting, together in various autonomous bodies. When something that is not working has to be changed, we have to come to an agreement with each other. The worst that can happen to a party is to conduct a halfway, ambiguous, contradictory policy, without a definite guiding threat.

### Proposal to the PSOE

Finally, our proposals to the PSOE at this time might consist in comparing the points of view of both parties on the following issues:

1. How to carry out political action by a new majority, by a new government and on their contents in the coming months.
2. How to get out of the impasse in which the autonomy processes are as a result of the attitude of the Suarez government.

3. Possibilities for international action to facilitate dialog between the parties in the worker movement in Europe on behalf of peace and very concretely for the success of the European Conference on Security and Cooperation that is to be held next autumn in Madrid.

4. But, owing to its proportions, perhaps the first and most fundamental step, what both our parties are going to do to mobilize public opinion and to prevent materialization of the government's plans to have Spain join NATO.

These certainly are not exhaustive topics. There are others, including issues on municipal policy, issues on expansion of labor union relations that would merit joint examination. In connection with expansion of labor union relations, we cannot understand the reasons why UGT [General Union of Workers] is opposed to CCOO [Workers Commissions] joining the European Labor Union Confederation of which the Italian General Confederation of Labor already is a member. It is something conceivable only on the basis of a criterion of sectarian narrowness that does no honor to those who hold to it.

Before and after the change, our party's policy, inspired by revolutionary Marxism, by the experience of other sister parties applied in our concrete situation, has consisted in trying to win a power space for the forces of labor and of culture in the prospects of a change of hegemony in Spanish society. The policy of democratic concentration in the first phase was aimed at that objective.

Our basic orientation is still the same. Possibly we have not been capable of making ourselves understood and especially of causing that policy, that need, to be understood by the large working masses. But we would be making a mistake if we were to attribute this shortcoming to our not having had initiative to mobilize the masses sufficiently. There may be, I do not question it, some case in which we may have committed a sin of omission in this area, but, on the other hand, in how many cases have we probably not committed rather a sin of excess.

The basic problem is something else and we have to view it clearly, because the key to everything is in its solution. The problem is that in this process of change we workers, the left, have not succeeded in establishing a common strategy.

The existence of a common strategy, of an understanding, is also essential for achieving extensive, powerful mass mobilizations that will have a real weight in the country's orientation and that will be something more than mobilizations of a vanguard. But I should also like to add that a common strategy of the left, a move toward positions more favorable to the workers at this time, does not mean division of the country into two blocs, one on the left and the other on the right. There is nothing farther from our thinking than to give rise today to that kind of situation that, moreover, would definitely not favor the left.

## Content of the Common Strategy of the Left

A common strategy of the left can and must tend -- as we conceive it -- to the creation of a majority of progress that can face up to the crisis with a criterion of national solidarity, inspired not by the interest of the large oligarchic groups, but rather by the interest of the people and the national strata, from the working class to business. Banking is not confronted. A majority that will apply the Constitution faithfully both with regard to the autonomy processes and to a respect for the rights of the citizens and a truly democratic policy of law and order, that will tackle with determination a reform of the administration of the state and that will carry out abroad a policy of peace and of nonalignment.

It would be a question of an agreement of progress limited in time -- until the 1983 elections -- and in objectives. It would be necessary to seek, for that agreement, the collaboration of nationalist and regionalist sectors and also of forces situated in UCD.

I do not pass judgment beforehand on whether that would or would not require the breakup of UCD. What seems to me evident is that the direction being imposed on UCD at present by Prime Minister Suarez is incompatible with that kind of policy. It is evident that the attitude of Suarez and of his principal fellow team member, Ferrando Abril, has become an obstacle to the solutions needed by the country.

## Suarez, Stubbornly Attached to Power

We believed, in the summer of 1976, that the appointment of Adolfo Suarez at the head of the government could favor democratic transition. It was a question of a young, bold, ambitious man without any definite ideology, not tied directly to the oligarchy, with an essentially bureaucratic career, who, by assuming a destiny that rained down on him miraculously, could act in the task of the moment with greater determination than other prominent figures with more history and more commitments. And for a time, precisely that time in which his degree of popularity reached its highest point, that happened. But gradually the oligarchic forces began to surround him, influencing him and determining his policy increasingly, and today we have to reach the conclusion that the characteristics that defined him have vanished in part and the ones remaining have become negative.

Boldness and ambition have turned the prime minister today into a man stubbornly attached to holding government authority, capable of overriding the will of the majority of the Chamber, capable also, as is commented these days, of running a brush over his own party, silencing disagreements and threatening even to dissolve Parliament early, so that the barons and other UCD members will not forget that he was the one who made them deputies.

The prime minister is shutting himself up more and more in the Moncloa [Palace] and he is reproducing, whether or not he is aware of it, the government styles among which his first period as a politician was carried out.

Thus, he has broken something that was an important achievement, the permeability of the various political formations that made it possible to make an agreed-upon Constitution and to achieve understandings on many positive aspects.

His policy is what may divide the country between left and right and bring about a confrontation between left and right.

In short, the same policy that Fraga Iribarne is advocating, although he hopes to dislodge Suarez and occupy his post for which he regards himself as better fitted.

A common strategy of the left that will offer acceptable prospects to sectors in the center, so that the present correlation of forces within UCD will be modified or so that the truly reformist and progressive sectors included in UCD will be segregated from it, is the strategy that would make it possible for another government to be formed in this Chamber with another policy and that would likewise prevent an early dissolution of Parliament, which would prove to be harmful to democracy and to the country's economy.

Undoubtedly the situation is difficult, but it cannot be forgotten that there was no revolution in this country, like the one that occurred in Portugal, for example, that put the forces of the left in a dominant position that was lost later. In Spain, the forces of the left have been in an unfavorable position, in this process, that we have not yet been able to change fundamentally. The situation is as it is and it is not worth the effort of giving way to laments. In order to overcome it, there seem to be opening up possibilities both on the side of cooperation and understanding by the forces of the left and of the dissident movements that are taking place among the forces of the center in opposition to the course being followed by Suarez.

#### The Government Has Not Yet Fallen

An effort must be made to take advantage of this situation and to make the whole democratic process move forward. And I would issue a warning both to us and to our PSOE comrades. The government has suffered a great political and moral defeat, but it is still there. We must not regard it as having fallen. The opposition has shown its strength arrogantly, but also the momentary limitations of this strength. If the opposition does not overcome its present weaknesses, does not devote itself to putting together a realistic alternative and to achieving broad popular support for it, if it merely takes delight in momentary effects not yet definite in their impact, it can be prepared for a counteroffensive by the government that is not free from dangers.



Therefore, we should compare our opinions with our socialist comrades without loss of time.

Today, comrades, we are already seeing the counteroffensive of which we are speaking begin to show up. Because, in my opinion, the initiative to have Spain join NATO in 1981 that has been circulating around in the form of rumors but never affirmatively, the attempt to raise a differentiation between the political forces of this country, not in the way in which it was after the parliamentary debate but, rather, in a different way, between those in favor of NATO and those opposed to it, is the beginning of the political counteroffensive by Suarez. It is an attempt to break up agreements, points of convergence that have occurred in the debate and to try to create a new correlation around the issue of NATO yes, NATO no.

And that means not only the danger of a policy of agreement with Coalition and of a greater shift to the right by the government's general policy. That means the danger that some allies that we have had in the discussion, in the political debate, and that seemed to be possible allies for a policy change by introducing this new issue of NATO, may vacillate, may draw back and actually thus another correlation of political forces may be created, another dynamics different from the dynamics generated by the censure motion. I believe that this is a very serious issue that must require a concrete resolution of the Central Committee, but it must also require that contact be made as rapidly as possible with the PSOE comrades and with other forces, in order to start an action that will tend to continue to crystallize the NATO issue. It is not only a question of not having Spain join NATO. It is a question of crystallizing that issue so that it will not be decisive in the establishment of a new correlation of political forces. I believe, although I imagine that Azcarate is going to treat these problems more fully later, I believe that we are being to feel the warning here, in that declaration that also takes on greater importance at the time when the president of the United States, Carter, is going to come to Madrid.

To conclude this speech, I should like to call attention to a topic that seems to me essential in the line of the analyses started in Cordoba: the topic of the party's political and organic strengthening.

We have held two important meetings in this period, one of secretaries general and the other of labor union members. In the first meeting, we discussed a double issue: the issue of intensifying political activity or debate, however we want to call it, in our groups, in order to vitalize them and to tie them really to the problems of the vast masses, in order to rejuvenate them and to open them up more, and, in addition, the issue of combing the country, for the purpose of filling the considerable areas that we have empty or almost empty, that is to say without sizable presence of the party. And, when we speak of areas, we are not referring simply to geography, but rather to social areas in which we are weakly established, like farmers and cattlemen, city middle classes, women, youth. I wish to devote -- although rapidly -- separate mention to the intellectuals who



are as disillusioned, if not more so, as other sectors over the ineffectiveness of the political change in the field of culture and -- why not say so -- because we ourselves have not been capable of devising conditions for carrying out a more effective, more offensive struggle on that front. The party, and when I say the party I am talking first of all about the same communist intellectuals, has to raise all over the country the need for promoting initiatives that will facilitate the action of the progressive intellectuals in the field of the struggle for culture, art, humanism, with the support of the worker movement and of the broadest sectors of the people. The working class needs the commitment of the intellectuals to achieve a more just, more egalitarian society.

In a society like the present one, which segregates bourgeois ideology and, more concretely, after 40 years of fascism and anticommunist ideology, the process of building the Communist Party is not going to occur spontaneously, but rather by means of a tenacious, persevering effort in which we must utilize all our forces to the utmost. There still are very important areas of fear and falling back. The other day, we stopped in the town near Leon where we took leave of the leaders of that province and there a man already advanced in years, a communist, approached me and greeted me as a comrade. When we asked him how they were politically in that town, he answered us that they had had 70 some votes, but, going more into detail, he said that there was no party organization there and that in spite of the pride with which he had declared himself to be a communist even before the war, he himself had no membership card. I am sure that there are hundreds, thousands, of similar cases in Spain and that, if we could pay attention to them, our organizations and, consequently, our number of voters would be multiplied. We are still very far from making the headquarters of our organizations somewhat inviting and hospitable. There should be item in them that will attract young persons. In many cases, they are full of symbols and ornaments that give the same rough, aggressive atmosphere that the organizations might have had at the time of establishment of the party or during the war.

We complain that there is not enough discussion in the groups and that it is not on the high political level on which it should be, and, nevertheless, we make no effort so that our comrades who are able to change that situation go to them and work patiently to give them greater activity and political perception. We frequently forget the cultural medium in which we are operating and the need for party cadres, workers or professionals, to act as real political educators. In the last few years, our party has developed in the midst of so many elections that, in a certain way, even within the party, we are suffering from the disease of electioneering and we forget that, in order to be a party of struggle and of government, as we describe ourselves, our cadres, all of them, have to devote part of their attention to what is strictly training and internal work.

We have to correct this situation seriously, if we want to participate in the 1983 elections in a way that will enable us to take a leap forward in our parliamentary representation and to have more effective weight in the correlation of political forces.

And I am not talking about aspects as important as our work among farmers and cattlemen, because Comrade Hoyos is going to do that in another item on the agenda.

I believe that the Central Committee must encourage the secretaries general so that, through them, the party's executive bodies on the various levels may prepare agreed-on plans and devote themselves to implementing them with all their forces.

Comrade Nicolas Sartorius will report, later, on the conclusions reached by the Executive Committee after the discussion with labor union leaders and members in the party, so that the Central Committee may make a definite decision on them.

In conclusion, I have limited myself, in this speech, to an analysis of features that seem to me to be most important in the political situation, without listing many of the initiatives and activities in hand and also many of the political events in this period. I believe that our discussion should produce, and I hope that it will produce, definite guidelines on our policy of cooperation with the socialists and other forces for a new government and a new majority capable of removing the obstacles to the democratic process and of making us move ahead toward the democratic state of autonomies, capable of concentrating progressively on the economic crisis, capable of keeping Spain out of military blocs.

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CDU: 1114

## MINISTRY AID: VIEWS ECONOMIC CONSTRAINTS ON DEFENSE

LD41033 Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 21 Jul 80 p 3

[Article by defense ministry departmental head Lennart Grape: "Will Sweden be Disarmed?"]

[Text] The Swedish commander-in-chief has presented a perspective plan, OB 80, which outlines the development of military defenses into the 1990's on three economic levels: a high one (the commander-in-chief's own), a medium level (closest to one of the government alternatives) and a low one (roughly the Social Democratic alternative).

Earlier perspective plans, which are produced regularly before each 5-year Defense Resolution--the next one will be adopted in 1982--have turned out to be inaccurate. We have quite simply had less defense for our money than the plans promised. There are strong reasons for having similar doubts about OB 80. There is much to indicate that this plan too, which represents basic material for the next Defense Resolution, is another shot in the dark: the uncertainties it contains are legion.

During the sixties and seventies it became increasingly obvious that it is impossible to maintain a large defense organization with a high material standard. The cost of the peacetime running of the defense organizations and of the development and acquisition of material has grown much quicker than the budget granted for the purpose.

Savings have had to be made. Paradoxically these have strengthened certain ominous trends. This is partly to do with the fact that savings measures have had to provide quick money, and partly because the defense organizations' staffing levels have been taboo when it comes to cuts.

Some effects:

Personnel costs have continued to rise slowly but surely despite a program of staff cuts without parallel in the public sector.

Conscription has been made an empty shell; basic training has been shortened. However, the most serious consideration is that refresher training has been drastically reduced. In 1978/79 it was down to only one-fifth of what had been fixed as the goal in the mid-sixties.

Despite this, peacetime running costs have laid claim to an ever greater proportion of defense spending.

Less and less money has been "left over" for material and refresher training courses. If this trend is allowed to continue it will amount to a threat to the concept of conscription.

Many people only identify conscription with basic training. But this is basically wrong. Conscription is a method of recruitment that is not worth much unless the conscripts selected are given a sufficiently good basic training, continual refresher course training and arms and other equipment, which would make our conscript units capable of meeting a well-equipped superpower aggressor immediately after mobilization.

Conscription is sometimes described as a "holy cow" in the defense debate. To speak merely of basic training for all able-bodied men in this context is like talking about only one of the cow's legs.

This is the background situation to the 1982 Defense Resolution: we have too few units that are sufficiently well trained and well equipped to measure up to the demands made of the defense forces of a neutral Sweden. On the equipment side--which has decreased from 50 to 30 percent of the budget since 1958--we are down to a volume of orders so small that not even the limited section of the defense forces which now meet modern requirements can be re-equipped in the future, unless we break the current trend in 1982.

Not even the medium-level plan could change this trend if we continue to make savings in the conventional way.

In the context of the economic frameworks that the commander-in-chief had been given to work with spending on equipment would decrease from around 10 to 10 percent of defense spending during the eighties. This would mean a growing "equipment death" that would in reality lead to Swedish disarmament by the year 2000.

These obvious trends are contributing to a development within the military defense forces which conflicts directly with the long-term changes we want to bring in to be able to adjust our defenses to international developments, both political and technological.

The government's instruction was to the commander-in-chief for the first phase of the retrospective planning expressed this objective by requiring descriptions of defense force structures with a swift reaction capacity, something essential in view of the increased risk of rapid surprise attacks (basic

Scenario 1), other solutions (basic scenario 2) were also to be considered, based on a long period of advance warning during which it would be possible to make good omissions in training and equipment.

The commander-in-chief's evaluation gave an unambiguous indication that military defenses should be developed in accordance with basic scenario 1—that is, in a completely different direction from the one we have been following.

The government's additional instructions to the sitting defense committee in the spring of 1980 were based on the assumption that the trends of the sixties and seventies must be broken. The situation is such that we must not shy away from unconventional measures. We must cut our coat according to our cloth and money must be found through savings on peacetime running costs. We must stop the more or less automatic self-destruction.

There is good reason to put from the very beginning a question on the economic viability of the commander-in-chief's proposal. We know from experience that the economic framework decided on for a planning period is soon eroded. There can be several reasons for this, in particular the desire to do more than resources allow.

But in recent years the main reason has been the difference between real price trends and compensation according to the net price index. Since it is impossible at the time of planning to predict the future state of the national economy the feasibility of a plan remains uncertain. The commander-in-chief gives a striking example of the significance of this uncertainty. He assumes that the difference between real price trends and the net price index for the coming 10-year planning period will be the same as it was in the seventies--8 percent.

A change of plus or minus 2 percent as a result of real price trends would mean that the real outcome of a decision in the spring of 1982 to adopt OR alternative 2 could be either of alternatives 1 or 3, which means the difference between a strong and a very weak defense structure.

It is of course unreasonable to assume that the government and Riksdag do not know what sort of decisions are being made.

An important question is whether the commander-in-chief's proposal breaks the negative trends that have been promoted in the past. Another obvious question is whether adjustments to the demands of basic scenario 1 are being made.

As far as the equipment share of defense spending is concerned a leveling out of the downward trend is taking place. Only in the commander-in-chief's alternative and in one of the three rejected alternatives at spending level 1 (called the "air force" alternative) is there a definite break in the trend—that is, a reversal of the previous trend. In the last-mentioned case this has been possible through a defense organization reduction of 110,000 men.



What would be interesting is an analysis of this latter alternative at the level of alternative 2. The intention would be to reach the best combination of a swift reduction in the defense forces' personnel content, a smaller peacetime force, selective conscription and/or short-term training with a safe balanced improvement in the trend than in the original alternative 2.

Both the defense commission and the commander-in-chief consider that adjustments in scenario 1 require the reinforcement of air defenses, especially in northern Norrland. This means reinforcement of fighter planes and air defenses, an improved system of command and an expansion of base organizations. Significant parts of these measures could only be implemented during the second period that the perspective plans cover, which is clearly unsatisfactory.

A high level of combat readiness and the availability of mobilized fighting units on land, on sea and in the air are another requirement needed to meet rapid surprise attacks. It is obvious that here we must ask whether the unhappy trend with regard to refresher course training will be broken. If we take the fiscal 1978/79 as our point of comparison (700,000 refresher course training days), the proposals mean that this figure would be doubled (in alternatives 1 and 2). This is of course a marked change of course, but the question is whether it is sufficient. The commander-in-chief himself seems uncertain about this.

But in general terms the rethinking in OB 8, in accordance with the emphasis on surprise attacks, is planned to be implemented in the late eighties. In addition the measures are subject to economic trends. This means that there is the risk that they will not be carried out at all if the economy becomes a problem, as it always has done in the past.

I have pointed to the enormous uncertainties that affect the chances of implementing OB80. Uncertainty whether the economic trend would, for example, in the event of alternative 2 being chosen and of an unfavourable trend in the economy lead to a buying power that would be equivalent to that in alternative 3. But the consequences would be worse than that. Since alternative 2 is based on universal conscription the cuts would be directed exclusively at equipment. This would mean a defense force without any equipment within a few years.

Another source of uncertainty is the extremely wide-ranging rationalizations in peacetime organization proposed under alternatives 2 and 3. The uncertainty consists in the hesitancy one can feel over the politicians' ability and willingness to make decisions and in particular swift decisions in this question. The local authorities affected will protest and demand compensation. The political parties cannot agree. The question will have to be further researched.

But if swift decisions are not made the commander-in-chiefs' plan will not work. The developments in the first and second periods would then risk becoming an extension of the ominous trends described in the introduction to this article. This would have catastrophic consequences for the defense forces. In the light of this especially it would be interesting to have further proposals on level 2 that would not be so sensitive to uncertainty of the type described.

## COLONEL VIEWS DEFENSE PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

LD250901 Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 22 Jul 80 p 2

[Article by Colonel Carl Bjoereman: "Ward Off, Delay or Capitulate"]

[Text] The agreement within Sweden's military leadership on the commander in chief's report "OB 80" has received a certain amount of attention. It is not so remarkable that there should be agreement on how the defense forces are to look at a spending level above the one defined by the government--that is, in the so-called Alternative 1. But there is also agreement on the balance struck at the lower spending levels. During the seventies disagreement was the rule rather than the exception.

Stig Synnergren, who was considered to be an effective commander in chief, did not have total control over the ranks. His final program plan (1979-84) was met, for example, by protests from the then chief of the navy. The latter did not think that the commander in chief had included any measures to alleviate the navy's serious plight.

The question of defense planning has, at its most general level, two dimensions, that are closely interconnected:

- 1) How can the combat forces be used in different possible crisis situations to achieve maximum fulfillment of the security policy objectives?
- 2) Against the background of the conclusions reached under point 1, what directions should be given to the production of combat forces?

It is important that the questions are considered in the correct order, i.e. the order in which they are given above.

When motivating his divergent views in the 1979-84 program plan the navy chief stressed that combat forces should always be used with the emphasis on border and coastal regions and that as a result of this naval forces ought to be given better consideration. In contrast to this line of thinking the commander in chief and other military leaders have attempted to arrive at an overall view by considering the use of forces first and the priorities in production thereafter. This may--together with the realization that everyone really is in "the same boat"--have made agreement possible.

The defense forces are the most important tool of security policy. It is their contribution to war that gives them their value in peacetime. They must preserve peace by deterring possible attackers from action. A presumptive aggressor should find attack unprofitable. But if we are attacked the defense forces ought at least to be able to prevent the aggressor from securing a firm foothold in our border and coastal regions. If it is, however, impossible to maintain at a reasonable price such "peripheral defenses," which would guarantee our success in this in all possible situations.

If we cannot have this sort of success we can make the aggressor's attack more difficult and delay him so that he does not reach his goals within a reasonable time--so-called "stubborn delaying combat." This method too, if it is made credible, has a deterrent effect.

Operational objectives must be able to be defined with reference to the prevailing conditions in a particular crisis situation. We must shape our strategy so that "favorable" situations can be exploited. But defense forces must not be allowed to be paralyzed in unfavorable situations. Defense objectives in such situations must be lowered. In "OB 80" the military leadership is agreed on this "both-and" principle.

Question 2 is the more controversial of the two. The direction given to the strategy is important. Defense force composition within a certain resource framework has a great influence on whether "peripheral defenses" or "stubborn delaying combat" is the more reasonable alternative.

The former requires strong elements of airborne and naval fighting forces, the latter first and foremost many strong army units. An effective defense code requires balance between different types of units with differing functions, which give both the capacity to meet an attack no matter where in the country it is launched and the capacity to group forces to maximize strength wherever it is needed. "OB 80" strives to achieve these goals--in total agreement.

But within the lowest economic framework as far as choosing between either the capacity to fight on coasts and borders--with the risk of being overwhelmed or the capacity to fight within the country--with the risk that the rest of the country will have to be abandoned--is concerned, the effect is as follows:

If the defense forces must be able to gather their strength for initial combat at coastal and border. With defense forces that have been so drastically reduced as at the lowest spending level there would however be a risk that we would be at the much greater disadvantage than we would at the higher spending levels. We would then run a great risk of being forced at an early stage to resort to combat involving delaying tactics deep within our territory. The demands that would in this case be made for increased capacity to fight of this type of operation would be impossible to meet on the lowest spending level while at the same time retaining balance between different defense functions.<sup>11</sup>

Faced with the paradox that the defense forces will be too weak to do anything but delay an aggressor--but that they at the same time would be insufficient to do even this--the commander in chief and the military leadership are calling a halt, in full mutual agreement. It is their way of indicating that the security risks with an alternative that is built on such few resources would be very great. But it also underlines the almost self-evident--but not always applied--thesis that security resources must always be evaluated and developed with reference to security objectives. The commander in chief's and the other military leaders' stance is therefore of interest in fields other than defense policy.

Striking a balance within defense is not a question of the "fair" or "equal" distribution of resources between different parts of the whole, whether within the standing defense forces or amongst all defense organizations. Nor is it a question that must be affected by industrial or local political considerations. It is the security objective that the defense forces as a whole must preserve peace, not the interests of different parts of the defense forces nor other interests, that should be decisive. It is more difficult but also more essential that we follow this principle, the fewer resources we have at our disposal. The precise significance of security objectives must be made perfectly clear. There must be no hesitation on this point within the defense forces if the politicians are to have enough facts to be able to make a correct decision when the time comes for them to apportion resources.

CSO: 3109

## GOVERNMENT CONFIRMS UPDATING OF SECRET MILITARY DEFENSE PLANS

Vienna OESTERREICHISCHE MILITAERISCHE ZEITSCHRIFT in German  
No. 4, Jul/Aug 80 pp 346-348

[Article by R.: "Questions of Security Policy"]

[Text] A question addressed by parliament to the government on 24 April on whether it does not consider it appropriate to "work out a plan of operations" in view of world conditions or to name an army commander-in-chief elicited the reply that secret operations plans have been worked out and are being updated. In any event, the government stated, Switzerland is prepared for the eventuality of war.

Prior to this, an interim report prepared for the members of the executive federal council had dealt with the "updated plans" for meeting emergency conditions and for taking precautionary measures. According to the report, Switzerland's security-political situation has grown more difficult since 1973. The military threat has not abated and international terrorism dare not be ignored. The military alliances have huge arsenals of nuclear and conventional weapons at their disposal; crisis situations in the Near East, in Africa and in Asia have had marked repercussions on Europe and may, for that matter, intensify.

The report emphasizes that the Swiss scenario calls for giving priority to the prevention of war by making preparations for defense. The strategic tools available are foreign policy; the army and civil defense; provisioning; foreign trade policy; psychological defense and protection of the state. The main strategic tasks are:

Maintenance of sovereignty during times of relative peace; preservation of peace and solution of crises; prevention of war through defense preparations (dissuasion); conduct of



war in terms of active military defense, minimum losses and a guarantee of survival as well as resistance in enemy-occupied areas. As before, the federal council assigns top priority to the prevention of war by making preparations for defense.

This calls for the army's reaching a high level of combat readiness quickly. It must be capable of waging war effectively for protracted periods of time. There are a number of elements of the Swiss army which need to be modernized. By the middle of the eighties, the federal council believes it will be possible to make improvements in anti-tank weaponry, air defense, fire support and night combat capability. "This will continue to depend, however, on whether the necessary funds are available."

### The Field of Armaments

The anti-aircraft officers association has not only called for the urgent procurement of the "Rapier" missile system but has also pointed out that the "counter-attack tanks" of the late eighties will have to be augmented by a suitable, coordinated anti-aircraft system. This will have to await the result of tests conducted with prototypes mounted on Swiss tank chassis. On 8 May, the federal council approved the Rapier weapons system as part of the 1980 military appropriations program.

Starting in March, tests were conducted with the Maverick air-to-ground missile; Alouette III helicopters and Hunter aircraft were employed as test carriers. The Mavericks are used against pinpoint targets. An electro-optical range finder is installed in the ca. 200-kg system, which is capable of transmitting a TV picture of the target area on a screen located in the cockpit of the aircraft. Using a sight reticule, the pilot can select a target; the missile stores this data and makes an independent approach.

Over and beyond this, a squadron of 15 transport helicopters is to be purchased. The choice is between the Sikorsky Black Hawk and the Superpuma, a prototype developed from the Puma SA-330. This squadron is to be integrated at the army level. The claim is being made that these aircraft will be in a position to move an infantry regiment (excluding heavy equipment) in the space of 4 hours. Procurement plans also call for the replacement of two training planes of the Mirage-III BG type at a cost of 30 million Swiss francs.

As a matter of principle, the share of domestic armament production is to be increased. As regards foreign procurement, licensing arrangements are to be given priority, which applies to the Rapier anti-aircraft system. The Skyguard system is already being produced in this manner. The procurement of anti-tank helicopters is also under discussion.

The Ministry of Military Affairs has also let it be known that the projected license production of a new combat tank is likely to be entrusted to a group of Swiss industrial firms. The overall contract is to go to Contraves AG, which will sub-contract to other Swiss firms. The contractor is to submit binding offers, but is not required to participate in the actual military-technical evaluation of the models being considered: most likely the American XM-1 and the Leopard 2.

One of the points being made is that development time of weapons systems has increased to 10-15 years by now. Utility is figured at 15-30 years. This means that much more time is assigned to planning. Given this state of affairs, the decision on whether to develop armaments on one's own cannot be postponed until just a few years before such armaments need to be introduced.

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CSO: 3103

## BACHMANN CASE REVEALS WEAKNESSES IN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

Zurich NEUE ZUERCHER ZEITUNG in German 5 Jul 80 p 23

[Article by E.A.K.: "Bad News From the Intelligence Service"]

[Text] Since the arrest and sentencing of agent K. Schilling in Austria the Bachmann case has been increasing in scope at irregular intervals. After it had first become apparent that the colonel could not be clearly and definitely classified anywhere in the hierarchy, that furthermore, to a large extent there was uncertainty about his manual of requirements, and that as a result, aside from the underchief of staff for intelligence and counterintelligence who is said to have offered his resignation more than once, no one was inclined to assume the higher responsibility, then in the course of time additional details about the "training" of spies leaked out. And the most recent revelation, according to which the director of the "special service" also had private funds in unknown amounts at his disposal, again opens up new perspectives. One need only do a bit of vigorous digging around, so it would seem, and layer after layer is exposed. And it takes some doing to believe that the last one has been reached with the "Hausmann funds."

It is always awkward when an intelligence service is the topic of conversation; for discretion is a fundamental prerequisite for productive work. But then, in our day people have such a burning interest in hardly anything else as they do in everything that in any way has something to do with the secret service or even gives the appearance of doing so. For that reason every intelligence service must devote a substantial part of its efforts to shielding itself, not only from sister organizations in other countries, but also from all the curious people in its own country, indeed often enough from the people who give the orders.

When Bachmann was taken on in the intelligence service, it seems that too little thought was given to the fact that a figure, who was so violently controversial and had met with hostility a few years before, cannot disappear overnight behind a veil of discretion, quite apart from the fact that this would scarcely have appealed even to his need to assert himself and to his newly acquired life-style. Retribution has set in: among the reactions to

the most recent information there is more than one which no doubt is motivated less by sincere concern for an intact intelligence service than by the urge, albeit late, to thoroughly square accounts politically with the chief author and publisher of the civil defense booklet (1969). The fact that these circles demand, in the same breath, more transparency in the intelligence service can be attributed to the same resentment; here and there people seem to harbor the suspicion that the colonel had made inquiries not only abroad. This is also the only way that the sensitivity and irritation can be understood after it became known that Bachmann received "private funds."

The fact that the use of "private funds" is supposed to have been halted last year shows that such practices are considered serious even in the Swiss Military Department. Bachmann seems to have a talent for creating a gray zone between the public and private sector; as is generally known, the Department of Justice, and Police did not publish the civil defense book, but rather Bachmann's Miles Publishing House--for all households in Switzerland and for translations abroad. The word may gradually have gotten around that in the intelligence service there must be extremely precise order in money matters; anything else clears the way for temptations, enticements and ultimately extortion. Thus, a too skimpy supply of personnel and money is also ill-considered and wrong. Just as judges must be well-off and well paid in order to keep corruption from them, the secret service must also live without concern because its units might easily indemnify themselves in another way.

In the face of the amply bungled situation it is absolutely essential that certain things be done. First, parliament, chiefly through its investigative commission, will have to assert and make good the claim of being honestly informed about the Bachmann case and of not being hidden by meaningless empty phrases or ambiguous denials. The dictates of prudence would suggest that this somewhat dirty linen not be aired in public.

But then a reorganization of the intelligence service cannot be avoided, not within the meaning of increased transparency, which in the case of a secret service would mean a "contradictio in adiecto," but rather in respect to several key questions which have surfaced in the past few years and which have given rise among the personnel not only to uneasiness and tension, but also presumably even to intrigues. In this connection better attention will have to be paid to see to it that "feudal domains" cannot develop within the service and that the problem of advancement is satisfactorily solved not only for aging career officers, but also for the young scientific staff employees. Finally, in the choice of the chiefs, it will have to be remembered that the most zealous people who push their way to the trough need not in every case even be the best ones, nor do those who only reluctantly allow themselves to be transferred to this branch because they are denied better things necessarily bring along the best motivation.

In this reorganization the experiences of secret service people will also have to be assessed who before and during World War II were in the most exposed positions, for example Allen Dulles and Reinhard Gehlen. It can be gathered from their memoirs that the intelligence service must rest on four pillars: 1. All publicly accessible information; 2. The inquiries tolerated in diplomacy (by military attaches, for example); 3. Reconnaissance based on purely technical means; and 4. The secret service (espionage) in the narrower sense.

In times of peace a great deal can be obtained from data available to anyone, naturally in very different amounts depending on the system of government, especially in the democratic West, and, of course, not only from American journals which, for example, provide quite unrestricted information about the deployment of American armed forces, but also specifically from the local press in which, even in Switzerland, often insignificant references to important facilities and shifts can be found. Even a minor state can find out an astonishing amount of information by painstaking collecting and evaluation, in cooperation with the diplomatic service.

In times of war, technical reconnaissance suddenly moves into first place: monitoring radio communication, breaking codes used for ciphering, radio range-finding to determine the location of radio signals, be it submarines that have surfaced, important command posts or combat airports. Thanks to such methods and not espionage the Allies were able to decimate the German submarine forces in such a way that they were finally victorious in the battle for the Atlantic. The German army intelligence service reported similar successes from the Russian campaign; it was not its fault that its information was of too little interest to the supreme commander. Of course, today electronics, especially the computer, offer completely new possibilities for coding; the same means can nevertheless also be used for decoding. Beyond that, with the use of reconnaissance satellites from space, extensive automatic listening facilities on "passages obliges" of the world's seas (against submarines) the great powers are in the process of struggling in a frightening and fascinating way for better and faster information; the small powers can only take notice of this. All the same, the establishment of a technical scientific branch in our intelligence service can no longer be delayed.

The intelligence service is an important instrument of the highest levels of government and of national defense in the broadest sense. This instrument must be once again ready for use as soon as possible. This presupposes that progress is being made with the cleanup. But it also presupposes that the matter is being taken care of properly and with the necessary care. There should be no special party politics in the intelligence service; because we all have a vital interest in having it function well and, if possible, excellently.



## 'AYDINLIK' LOOKS AT CAUSES OF MIGRATION FROM EAST

Istanbul AYDINLIK in Turkish 2, 3 Jul 80 p 4

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[Text] Migration from the village to the city has been going on for years in our country. In recent years, however, a sizable increase has begun in western migration from eastern and southeastern Anatolia. This increase, indeed, is in progress at the moment. Though we have no precise statistics on this particular subject, recent migration figures are pretty high.

Although a minority attributes this migration to regional blood feuds as one of the most important factors, a majority of the public is puzzled as to the causes of this migration. Politicians who nevertheless bury their heads in the sand make the problem even worse by refusing to listen to the growing number of eastern migrants. In this article, we will attempt to reveal, not what happens to the migrants, but the underlying reasons behind their migration. In another article, we will deal with the theory of migration as evidence of the growth of capitalism in Turkey and as the inevitable consequence of this growth.

## Causes of Migration

Let us dwell for a moment on the following few examples. Common expressions frequently encountered in reports in the daily press are: "We left because we could no longer stand the oppression of the landlords." "The landlord sold and we were left with nowhere to go." "An entire village in Urfa which could not stand the oppression of the landlord migrated."

Land ownership is everything in the East today. The landlords make the peasants under their patronage work like slaves and use various methods to make them dependent on the landlords. A peasant's debt to the landlord whose fields he works can never be paid off. The landlords apply every kind of pressure to the peasants who work for them, including economic exploitation. In many places in the East, a young tenant even has to obtain the landlord's permission to get married. It is hard for a young man to get married if the landlord does not approve or does not get his tribute,

and if the young man marries anyway, he is inextricably in trouble with the landlord. Combined with his economic exploitation, the landlord's arbitrary power is making life in the village intolerable. In many cases, entire villages in the East have migrated. Once life becomes so unbearable, there is nothing for the peasants to do but migrate. The best, most recent example of this is the village of Karagol in Pulumur which was wiped off the map last year. The landlords who owned 70,000 donums /1 donum=about .25 acre/ of land sold all of it, forcing the village of 70 households to leave. Now you cannot even find one home in this village. The village was completely wiped off the map in a single stroke. Also, most of the time, the landlords are behind the many blood feuds and other causes of migration. In order to maintain their arbitrary power, the landlords use conflicts that erupt between peasants as weapons against them, thus retaining their lordly positions by setting the peasants against one another.

#### Acute Unemployment

Agriculture and animal husbandry, which are the only means of making a living, are extremely backward and usually carried on by primitive methods, industry and business in the area being negligible, and this is another factor forcing the area's inhabitants to migrate. Even in the smallest towns of eastern and southeastern Anatolia today, one may see five or six coffee houses where men sit idle. The state has done nothing about opening a variety of job opportunities in the East. A milk plant was built in 1967 in Tunceli, a province without a single industrial establishment, and 11 years later, it was reported that "electricity may be provided" for this plant. And for a plant like this which is only 1.5 hours away from the Keban Dam, one still cannot report "it has electricity." It is a fact that more than half of the projects planned for our eastern regions in the State Planning Office program have not been realized for various reasons and most of them have been shifted to western locations. In this situation the Eastern man who cannot find a job is forced to leave hearth and home and go elsewhere.

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[Text] According to the unofficial results of our own research, the rate of those able to find jobs where they live in our eastern regions is 1 or 2 in 10. Most of the others subsist by other means. Thus the East is clearly a bed of unemployment. And the people are forced to migrate with the hope of finding a job.

#### Other Social Services Lacking

Services such as health, roads, water, electricity, housing, schools and so forth which are the most basic needs of the eastern people are practically nonexistent. There are still village roads in the East left over from the

Russians. In Udam Township in Pulumur and Cerme Township in Kigi, there are 20 village roads left from the Russians, and the peasants keep repairing these roads to maintain communications with the urban centers. Bulldozers and graders are practically unheard of in these areas.

We asked a person working at the Hasangazi Health Clinic, which was built in a small eastern village: "What kind of work do you do?" He replied: "We have three people working in this clinic. If we tried to go around to all the villages in our clinic's area, we would have to walk 600 kilometers by road and footpath. And even then, it would be possible only in the 6 months of summer. The village of Kabayel alone has 26 pathways. So how are citizens who are seriously ill to get to us even in the summer, never mind the winter -- winter hasn't come yet -- or how are we to get to them? We ask for a car, we are not even given a car."

Again, electricity was supposed to be provided for around 100 villages in Tunceli last year; only 25 villages got electricity. The Turkish Electric Power Enterprise regional director explained this, saying, "We put it up for bids but there were no takers."

Even a tiny city like Tunceli is in need of 5,000 housing units today. The mayor said that they had reported it at the time and that they were unable to take care of this need through their own resources. But they have heard nothing as yet from the authorities, he said.

Certainly the eastern people, who cannot find doctors to tend the sick, roads to bring in their supplies, water to drink, schools for their children or houses to live in, have no choice but migration.

#### Growing Anarchy and Religious Conflicts

Growing anarchy in the East is threatening the public safety of the citizenry. Clashes between groups are gradually becoming intertribal conflicts and taking on the cast of blood feuds, and this has begun to be an important factor in the people's migration from the region. These reasons have now begun to predominate in migration from Urfa, Mardin and Diyarbakir. On the other hand, the religious and nationalist fight which is being waged by the Nationalist Action Party in our eastern regions has also now reached the stage of driving people from their homes and communities. New examples of this are seen everywhere in Kahramanmaraş, Elazığ, Tunceli, Erzincan and many more eastern provinces. These two reasons causing people to leave their ancestral lands have become uppermost in recent years and the firebrands creating this climate are directly or indirectly under the wing of the administrations.

People are migrating wholesale, even abroad, in order to escape the scourge of anarchy. So it will come as no surprise if the migration question becomes more interesting and more intense in the future.

If eastern villages are being vacated today as a result, if more than half the population of a district of around 30,000 has migrated and if this migration is continuing and growing today, the reasons for it cannot be passed over lightly. The solution is not to make the state into a police state. Whether we like it or not, the eastern people are not migrating today; they are being forced to migrate. And chief among what is forcing them is the administrations themselves and their policies. This is only a different way of driving people from their homes and communities. Unless the injury is approached in a better way than with a Middle Ages mentality, the injury will only grow worse. It will do no good to sound the trumpet after we have passed the camp. If you notice, in all of the causes we have considered, the eastern people are seen to have been abandoned to the level of the Middle Ages. Unless we clean up the landlord situation and the remnants of the Middle Ages, this problem cannot be resolved. Yet our present administration is in the position of protector of this system, and one more Turkish problem is pointing up the need for land reform.

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